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The New Deal created a separate and unequal credit market—high-interest,
non-bank, installment lenders in black ghettos and low-cost, securitized, and
revolving credit card market in the white suburbs. Organized protest against this
racialized inequality was an essential but forgotten part of the civil rights movement.
After protests and riots drew attention to the reality that the poor were paying more
for essential consumer products than the wealthy, the nation’s policymakers began
to pay attention. Congress held hearings and agencies, and academics issued reports
examining the economic situation. These hearings led to new federal agencies and
programs, executive actions, as well as several acts of legislation. These
Congressional investigations and the theories and explanations emanating from
policymakers and academics were the genesis of decades of legislation aimed at
supporting minority banks and other institutions. The resulting policy framework is
still in effect and includes: the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), the
Community Development Financial Institution Act (CDFIA), as well as several key
provisions and mandates regarding minority banks in banking legislation. In this
Article, I will argue that the foundational theoretical premise of these laws and
policies is flawed. Though policymakers and scholars accurately diagnosed the root
causes of the disparate credit market, the solutions did not correspond with the
problem and have therefore been ineffective. These laws and policies were not
aimed to address the systemic causes of the disparity but only served to treat its
symptoms. The misguided focus on small community banking, minority-owned

101

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395876

Clean Final Edit_Baradaran.docx (Do Not Delete)

102

U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW

5/18/19 8:43 PM

[Vol. 9:X

banks, and mission-oriented institutions as a response to structural inequality has
been the dominant framework in banking reform.
In analyzing the varied, but theoretically consistent response to lending
inequality, this Article also challenges a long-standing banking myth that “small
community banking” or “microfinance” is the answer to poverty, specifically for
marginalized communities. This idea was the foundational theory of the minority
banking industry, the CRA, the CDFIA, and almost every legislative response to
credit inequality for the past fifty years. The premise of these laws is that that
marginalized communities, having been left out of the dominant banking industry,
will pool their resources and collectively lift themselves out of poverty. As such,
these laws are rooted in neoliberal and libertarian concepts of banking market even
as they have been championed by progressive reformers and community activists.
For most policymakers, activists, and scholars, the buzzword is “community
empowerment” and they have legislated accordingly. In doing so, they have avoided
addressing the root causes of the problem and have shifted the responsibility of a
solution to the disenfranchised communities themselves instead of devising
comprehensive federal policy solutions. This Article will trace the genealogy of this
legislation and offer solutions that will address the root causes of this inequality.
THE NEW DEAL FOR WHITE AMERICA
The New Deal changed America’s legal and political landscape, but it also
transformed the nation’s banking and credit markets. Banking reforms and
regulations, proposed by progressives and populists for decades, finally passed into
law with a defeated and shamed business sector. Southern democrats, populists,
labor coalitions, and free silverites had been fighting “money trusts” and Wall Street
power since the founding clash between Hamilton and Jefferson. Finally, the New
Deal coalition, composed of a Southern Democrat bloc in the senate and FDR,
overcame the banking lobby’s opposition to government intervention. The New
Deal coalition wanted to prevent the outsized influence and financial heft of
Northern metropolis banks. They advocated a mixed economy of banks working
with federal government institutions to provide credit to small farmers and
landowners. Thus, the banking and credit reforms passed during the New Deal were
a significant progressive reordering of business regulation. Its centrally-controlled
economic planning, Keynesian stimulus programs, and foundational social welfare
infrastructure made the New Deal the closest that America came to democratic
socialism.1
Unfortunately, most of the significant New Deal policies were administered
in such a way as to create categorical exclusion of blacks from government

1. See also IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR
TIME (2013).
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subsidies.2 This combination of progressive banking reform and a regressive racial
hierarchy resulted in a banking legislative framework that propelled post-war
American prosperity through an exclusionary mortgage and consumer credit
apparatus. Through executive action and Congressional legislation, a new legal
framework emerged during the New Deal era. These included several credit and
banking agencies and regulators including: the Home Owners Loan Corporation
(HOLC), the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLB), the Federal National Mortgage
Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA),
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). These institutions worked
together to promulgate the rapid and effective dissemination of low-cost credit to
new homeowners. These agencies, combined with postwar economic growth,
created a homeowning, capital-creating, and predominantly white middle-class.
Having built the new middle-class on mortgage credit, these programs also
exacerbated poverty in segregated black communities.3 The government-fueled
mortgage markets created homeowning white suburbs and a tenant-dominated
black urban centers.
2. See IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE 17, 51 (2005) (“[T]he
wide array of significant and far-reaching public policies that were shaped and administered during the
New Deal and the Fair Deal era of the 1930s and 1940s were crafted and administered in a deeply
discriminatory manner.”); see also KATZNELSON, supra note 1.
3. See LOUIS HYMAN, DEBTOR NATION: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA IN RED INK 51 (2013)
(discussing how President Roosevelt and Congress could have made a different choice which would
not have resulted in such stark inequality. For instance, Roosevelt could have channeled public funds
towards building low-income housing and establishing much-needed infrastructure in urban-poor
neighborhoods. He almost did just that. One of the most robust New Deal programs was the Public
Works Administration (PWA), which was run by Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, a committed
civil rights advocate and former president of the Chicago NAACP. The PWA was the federal
government’s largest construction effort to date with a $6 billion budget used to build thousands of
bridges and roads that put millions of Americans to work. But the PWA’s initial housing decision was
to use funds to build homes and infrastructure in poverty-stricken areas, including inner-city ghettos.
The PWA’s purpose was to provide a job-creating economic stimulus while offering a benefit to the
public. Ickes believed that the Roosevelt administration should use the New Deal to address America’s
urban poverty. He warned that if the slums were not rehabilitated, they would inhibit economic growth
in America’s cities); see also ROBERT CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF
NEW YORK 607–14 (1974) (discussing how investors were interested in revamping the single-family
mortgage market, so the reforms followed this route. Unfortunately, these reforms worked directly
against the urban poor. For example, the government used many PWA grants in major cities like New
York and Chicago to route roads and bridges over and through the ghetto, a decision that favored
bridge-and-tunnel commuters, neglected public transportation, and divided major thoroughfares in
long-established communities); HYMAN, supra, at 51–53 (discussing how Ickes complained “that most
of the projects that came before [the PWA] were conceived more for the speculative benefit of their
promoters than for the advantage of the people who need modern housing at a low price.” The
opposition believed that the PWA’s goal should be to get private investors involved by offering them
a share of the profits. However, investors lacked interest in rebuilding inner cities, so the plan was
scuttled); GAIL RADFORD, MODERN HOUSING IN AMERICA: POLICY STRUGGLES IN THE NEW DEAL
ERA 85–110 (2008) (discussing how Ickes said that no less than “the future financial stability of many
of our urban centers” depended on “the prompt reclamation of their slum areas.” By 1933, Ickes set
aside $485 million to build low-cost apartment buildings across the country. Critics fiercely opposed
this plan. They said that it was not the federal government’s responsibility to deal with urban housing
problems).
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Government documents and FHA manuals reveal that race became the
primary determinant of mortgage eligibility. Thousands of FHA officials
demarcated every neighborhood in the country by underwriting risk. Using
standardized evaluation forms, officials from the FHA determined what homes the
FHA would guarantee. The most important determination on each form was the
percentage of “negro” or “foreign born” residents in each neighborhood as well as
the likelihood of “infiltration” of each race.4 Race became a proxy for credit risk in
government underwriting. These maps had four color categories based on perceived
risk: A (green), B (blue), C (yellow), and D (red); green being the most desirable and
red being the least.5
Using race as a proxy to determine future price appreciation was a selffulfilling prophecy. The scale ranged from green neighborhoods that were
homogenous and white to neighborhoods marked too risky “red” that were
predominantly black. The race of the area’s residents was a greater factor in the
color-coded desirability determinations than other quantifiable metrics like the
home’s age, proximity to city centers, resident’s creditworthiness, transportation
opportunities, public parks, or public services.6 For example, one of the wealthiest
black neighborhoods in the country was in the Atlanta area surrounding Morehouse
and Spelman Colleges. The FHA form evaluating this area marked it as the “best
negro area in Atlanta” and noted that the homes were mostly owned by
“professional men.” They even determined that it was a highly desirable location
“for negroes.” Yet they still demarcated the area as a red zone and advised banks
not to underwrite mortgages therein.7 This process of “redlining” eventually created
a dual credit market based on race.8
These surveyors were both reflecting and entrenching segregation patterns
that led to higher-valued white neighborhoods and lower-valued black ones.
Housing segregation was institutionalized and became a defining feature of the legal
credit framework. It was not just the FHA that used these maps. Because the
mortgage insurance market changed the nature of home lending, any bank providing
a mortgage required an FHA guarantee. It would be foolish not to. Banks, credit

4.
5.

Original FHA forms are available at https://dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/.
See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 198, 202 (1985); see also RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 64 (2017). Before the mortgage
market went into full effect, the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) created maps of every
neighborhood and categorized the risks of lending therein. HOLC appraisers used census data and
elaborate questionnaires to predict property appreciation in neighborhoods across the country. The
HOLC then used this data to create meticulous maps giving each metropolitan region and
neighborhood across the country a value.
6. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 198–99, 202.
7. Robert K. Nelson et al., Mapping Inequality, AMERICAN PANORAMA, https://
dsl.richmond.edu/panorama/redlining/#loc=11/33.7535/-84.3565&opacity=0.8&city=atlanta-ga&
sort=33&area=D17&adimage=3/75/-120 [ https://perma.cc/LHP5-UTRM ] ( l ast visited Mar. 8,
2019 ).
8. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at 64–65, 77–91.
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unions, thrifts, building and loans associations, and other mainstream mortgage
lenders relied on these risk calculations when they determined branch locations and
made all lending decisions.
The FHA did more to shape American life than any other New Deal agency.
Congress created the FHA as part of its National Housing Act of 1934 and
supplemented the FHA through the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (the GI
Bill), administered by the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
Between 1934 and 1968, the FHA and the VA programs created the modern
mortgage market. The joint programs shaped the lending market for the next
century. Through mortgage guarantees and standardization, Title I of the National
Housing Act enabled the FHA to lower mortgage risk and increase capital
investments in housing. The FHA credit insurance fund was backed by the full faith
and credit of the U.S. Treasury, but it worked effectively to unleash billions of
dollars of private capital investments worldwide.9 By shielding banks and other
mortgage lenders from the risk of default, these new agencies enabled
unprecedented amounts of private capital to fund residential mortgages. Through
credit insurance and secondary market creation, Congress and the alphabet soup of
banking and credit agencies made mortgage loans simple, low-risk, and plentiful.10
Congress created Fannie Mae in 1938, which facilitated a secondary market
that enabled investors and lenders to share the risk of mortgage default. Private and
institutional investors in one part of the country could invest in mortgages in
another, assuring that capital would always find yield. Treasury-backed insurance
lowered risk and government-created secondary markets lowered transaction costs,
which led to soaring bank profits and capital investments.11 These markets
remained intact even as some New Deal programs came to an end and the
government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) were partially privatized.
Government agencies mandated uniformity to protect their investments. Even
the construction of the homes was determined according to standard specifications.
Lenders also had to comply with standard loan underwriting. The banking and
mortgage agencies issued protocol and standards to align loan contracts. Interest
rates and terms were dictated by federal standards. The standard issue mortgage
9. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 17 (2006) (discussing how new home construction doubled
from 1936 to 1941. In 1936, the FHA had lent half a billion dollars in guaranteed mortgages. By 1939,
they had already issued $4 billion in mortgages and home improvement loans. Housing starts were
332,000 in 1936 and 619,000 in 1941); see also JACKSON, supra note 5, at 205.
10. See FED. HOUS. ADMIN., FHA STORY IN SUMMARY, 1934–1959 at 4 (1959), noted in
HYMAN, supra note 3, at 53 (explaining that the federal guarantee revolutionized mortgages because the
fund insured 90% of individual home mortgages. According to Julian Zimmerman, the FHA
commissioner in the 1950s, when the scheme was first proposed, “it was such an innovation that many
considered it radical and unworkable.” According to Zimmerman, “it was the last hope of private
enterprise. The alternative was socialization of the housing industry.”).
11. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 55 (explaining that the FHA program “completely
reversed . . . the conventional justification for government intrusions.” FHA money was “not the dole”
and “not taxpayer money”).
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created by these reforms included reduced down payment requirements, lengthened
loan terms, and low interest rates.12 A fixed rate mortgage with a 6% APR
self-amortized over thirty years was typical. Banks were unlikely to lend to
borrowers if the FHA did not insure the loan, and thus, banks were unlikely to stray
from the mandated formula. In addition to standardized terms, the borrowers fit a
certain “government-approved” mold, which was usually white, middle-class, and
male. Yet to call those who qualified for these loans “the middle-class” is an evasive
and circular description. These borrowers were formerly wage workers who lived
near their place of employment, but through these low-cost mortgage loans, they
became the much-heralded American middle-class. Most of these borrowers earned
less than $2500 per year and could not have afforded to purchase a home even with
a mortgage, which was hard to come by.13 After the New Deal mortgage reforms,
the new middle-class could pay less in mortgage payments than they had previously
paid for rent. Typical was the former New York City resident who said of his new
home in suburban New Jersey: “We had been paying $50 per month rent, and here
we come up and live for $29.00 a month.”14 With a few thousand dollars in savings,
a wage earner could buy a house, build wealth, raise their children in the suburbs,
and generate taxable income.15
The FHA mortgage fundamentally changed American culture, creating the
uniform white middle-class suburb and its attendant services—parks, schools,
communities, and the bowling leagues lauded by Robert Putnam as essential for
civic engagement and public trust.16 Yet this government-manufactured prosperity
excluded blacks. The low-cost and abundant flow of mortgage credit stopped at the
red lines around black ghettos.
The FHA’s 1939 Underwriting Manual explicitly prohibited lending in
neighborhoods that were changing in racial composition.17 The 1941 manual
warned that “the rapidly rising Negro population ha[d] produced a problem in the

12. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 204–05 (discussing how first, prior to their passage, a
borrower would need a down payment anywhere from 30–70% of the home price to purchase a home.
After these loans, a down payment of 10% was enough because the government would now essentially
insure up to 90% of the collateral. Second, by extending the repayment period to thirty years and
insisting that all loans be fully amortized, they reduced monthly payments and dramatically reduced
default. Third, they created uniform housing standards that all new houses had to meet, which favored
new, homogenous homes. And, Fourth, by eliminating high default risks, the programs brought
mortgage interest down from 15% to 2–3%, making it possible for families of moderate means to
become homeowners.); see also HYMAN, supra note 3, at 56–57.
13. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 71.
14. See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 17.
15. See id.
16. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: AMERICA’S DECLINING SOCIAL CAPITAL,
http://www.directory-online.com/Rotary/Accounts/6970/Downloads/4381/Bowling%20Alone%
20Article.pdf [ https://perma.cc/CAM2-7YYZ ] ( last visited May 14, 2019 ).
17. See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH, AND SOCIAL
POLICY IN AMERICA 37 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2010); see also DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 54 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1993).
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maintenance of real estate values.”18 A good neighborhood, according to the FHA,
was one that prevented “inharmonious racial or nationality groups,” which meant
that the only groups that did not threaten property values were white families.19 The
FHA even offered suggestions for the best way of achieving this result, which they
said was through “[race-based] subdivision regulations and suitable restrictive
covenants.”20 Maintaining the racial purity, or a “harmonious racial mix,” became a
vested interest for homeowners, realtors, and banks—all of whom held a financial
stake in these mortgages. “If a neighborhood is to retain stability,” said the FHA
manual, “it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same
social and racial classes.”21 With government guarantees on the line, neighborhood
groups vigilantly enforced racial covenants. Racial covenants were included in
mortgage deeds, notes, and any sale transactions. The buyer contracted to only sell
the home to those of the Caucasian race. The Supreme Court upheld these contracts
in a 1926 case,22 and they remained valid until a different Court invalidated them in
the 1948 case Shelly v. Kramer. 23 However, the FHA continued to promote their
use until the 1950s.24
As the white suburbs and black inner cities diverged in their mortgage access,
two different credit markets emerged in both zones. Lower-risk mortgages led to
higher wealth and stability in the white suburbs. These conditions also led to a
healthy consumer credit market. In the redlined black ghettos, the economic climate
was radically different. Without access to low-cost mortgages or even bank
branches, the lenders that filled the gap in the ghetto were loan sharks, high-cost
lenders, and contract sellers. By the 1950s, 85% of the homes sold to blacks in
Chicago were sold on mortgage-mimicking contract sales with exploitative terms.25
Speculators purchased properties for a few thousand dollars with private capital and
then “sold” the home to a black buyer through contract for three to four times the
price of the home.26 The contract sale was akin to a rent-to-own sale.27 The “buyer”
was just a tenant with an option to own the home at some point in the future and
18.
19.
20.

See CONLEY, supra note 17, at 37.
See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5.
See OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 18; see also FED. HOUS. AUTH., UNDERWRITING
M ANUAL, pt. II, ¶ 233 (1936), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015018409246;view=
1up;seq=13 [ https://perma.cc/NH99-EFBH ]; JACKSON, supra note 5, at 208.
21. FED. HOUS. AUTH., supra note 20.
22. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
23. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
24. See BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE AND THE EXPLOITATION
OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA 43 (2009), citing Arnold R. Hirsch, Choosing Segregation: Federal Housing
Policy Between Shelley and Brown, in JOHN F. BAUMAN ET AL., FROM TENEMENTS TO THE TAYLOR
HOMES: IN SEARCH OF AN URBAN HOUSING POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 211–12
(2000); see also id.
25. See SATTER, supra note 24, at 38.
26. See DEMPSEY TRAVIS, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BLACK CHICAGO 128–29 (1981).
27. See SATTER, supra note 24, at 5 (discussing how the contract sellers “used the home as ‘bait’
to defraud the Negro out of a substantial sum of money and then push the [buyer] out into the street
[in order to] defraud another party.”).
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only if they made every payment on time. Blacks were therefore paying more each
month, and what they were getting in return was a more tenuous property interest.28
Their rights to the land was a loophole-laden contract as opposed to a deed. With
one missed payment, a borrower was deemed to be in default and could lose their
entire investment—the property, down payment, and all home improvements.29
The bankers and brokers defended these contracts as a consequence of market
pricing. “In a free economy a house is worth what anyone will pay for it,” said one
contract seller.30
Yet mortgage lending was nothing like a “free economy” because the federal
government was artificially lowering interest rates and prices through structural
supports. It was exactly the lack of government mortgage guarantees in the redlined
zones that created the market for these costly contract sales while suburban
mortgages were artificially buoyed.31
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSUMER CREDIT
Title I of the National Housing Act of 1934
Before the New Deal credit reforms, most consumer lending took the form
of installment loans, which is a loan that is paid off in small amounts over a short
period of time. The same store that sold the merchandise provided the loan and
assumed the risk of default. The interest rates were usually high, and the payback
period was short. Often retailers would charge more than what was legal by simply

28. Id. at 242–44, 248–49.
29. Id. at 4; see TRAVIS, supra note 26, at 157.
30. See SATTER, supra note 24, at 137, citing interview with John W. Baird (Feb. 13, 2004); see
also BAIRD & WARNER, INC., 1855–1980: CELEBRATING 125 YEARS IN REAL ESTATE (1980).
31. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 141–44 (discussing how, though black families could get
mortgages, they paid significantly more for them than their white neighbors. In fact, the data on these
subpar loans is clear that being black was directly correlated with paying high interest, more so than any
other factor. The black middle-class was left to find mortgage loans in the private market. Few
institutional investors were willing to provide capital for black mortgages, and black institutions did not
have enough capital to provide for all such loans. In sum, the main barrier to black mortgages in the
1950s, according to a representative of the National Association of Home Builders was “the lack of
adequate financing” caused by “deep-rooted prejudice.” White insurance companies had provided
much of the initial investment funds for the FHA markets, but black insurance companies did not have
adequate capital. By 1945, the 35 members of the National Negro Insurance Association (NNIA) had
only $1.5 million in capital—they held a total of 424 mortgages. Mechanics and Farmer affiliate, North
Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company accounted for 55% of these funds. In contrast, just the top
12 white insurance companies alone held $633 million in mortgages. The debt cycle became
self-reinforcing after the original exclusion. Over 70 percent of suburban black families had to borrow
just so they could purchase cars, appliances, furniture, and other side effects of middle-class life. The
black middle-class’s debt caused lenders to charge the black middle-class higher interest on each new
loan. More debt begets higher interest and vice versa. The added debt burden and high interest was a
direct result of the lack of wealth and looping around once again, the debt made it even harder to accrue
more wealth.).
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elevating the base price of the goods. Most families with little wealth and low wages
relied on installment loans to purchase appliances and furniture.32
The purpose of Title I of the National Housing Act of 1934 was to provide
economic stimulus by insuring low-dollar consumer credit loans for improving real
property.33 These loans, administered by local banks and insured by the FHA, were
intended to stimulate the construction industry by encouraging the flow of credit to
the urban real estate market.34 When it functioned as intended, Title I allowed
owners of aging urban housing to stay in their homes, preserving the local urban
tax base and preventing the spread of urban blight, all key FHA policy goals of the
time.35 Though Title I lapsed in 1937, it was renewed thereafter, and FHA continues
to insure loans for home improvement under Title I to the present day.
Financial institutions who wished to participate in Title I had to be vetted, as
the statutory language of the National Housing Act of 1934 required participants to
be “reliable financial institutions.” National and state banks, trust companies, and
building and loan associations who already participated in the Federal Home Loan
Bank System were automatically approved for FHA Title I insurance.36 Other
financial institutions had to be individually approved to participate.
In lieu of premium payments by participating financial institutions, the
National Housing Act authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to
provide Title I’s initial capital of up to $200,000,000.37 While other FHA programs
like the Title II Mutual Mortgage Insurance program maintained a series of capital
reserves funded by mortgage fees, Title I had no similar fund of its own.38 Based
upon the FHA’s first annual report, it appears instead that the FHA’s Title I cap
was funded exclusively by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.39
Once approved, participating lenders were left to decide for themselves how
to screen potential loan applicants.40 The terms of the FHA insurance limited
compensation for lender claims to 20% of the aggregate amount leant under Title
I. This incentivized lenders to perform due diligence on potential applicants and
32. Id. at 32.
33. See Hyman, supra note 3, at 96.
34. RAYMOND J. SAULNIER, HAROLD G. HALCROW & NEIL H. JACOBY, FEDERAL LENDING,
LOAN INSURANCE AND LOAN GUARANTEES 288 (1958).
35. Judge Glock, How the Federal Housing Administration Tried to Save America’s Cities,
1934–1960, 28 J. POL’Y HIST. 290 (2016), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journalof-policy-history/article/how-the-federal-housing-administration-tried-to-save-americas-cities
19341960/DF2237D887E2D45D4B422AB0CE1D9F52/core-reader [ https://perma.cc/KW6F4YJL ]. Note: future citations of Judge Glock’s article will not include page numbers, as the article is
not numbered in its online form.
36. JOSEPH D. COPPOCK, GOVERNMENT AGENCIES OF CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT 23
(1940).
37. National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§1701–1750 (1934).
38. Glock, supra note 35.
39. H.R. Doc. No. 88, at 24–25 (Jan. 29, 1935), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/
default/files/pdf/First-Annual-Report-of-the-Federal-Housing-Administration.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/G6VL-E5YG ].
40. COPPOCK, supra note 36, at 23.
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attempt collection on past-due debts directly from the borrower when possible.41
Lending institutions could also buy and sell the notes on loans made under Title I,
creating a nascent secondary market.42
When unable to collect, lenders could file a claim with the FHA in
Washington, D.C. no earlier than sixty days and no later than thirteen months after
the last payment received.43 Provided the claim did not exceed the statutory cap of
20% of an institution’s aggregate loaned dollars under Title I, the FHA would pay
any and all of the following: net unpaid amount of the funds advanced to the
borrower; uncollected earned interest; uncollected late charges; uncollected court
costs; attorney’s fees; and handling costs.44 The Government then assumed the debt
and could attempt collection from the borrower.
Lenders, free to establish their own screening methods for borrowers,
preferred borrowers with stable income and prospects of long-term employment
rather than borrowers of a specific overall income level.45 Thus, salary, not overall
wealth or the ability to provide collateral, played a large role in a borrower’s
creditworthiness in the consumer credit market spawned and stimulated by Title I.46
While the precise experience of a borrower seeking a home improvement or
modernization loan under Title I varied with each financial institution, certain
general features of the experience are worth noting.
First, the borrower filled out a form stating the amount sought and the uses
to which he would put the money if approved.47 If the borrower’s statements
signaled compliance with the parameters of the program, the lender would notify
the FHA in Washington, D.C., which would adjust the lender’s insurance reserve
credit accordingly.48 Because lending institutions generally paid the vendor of goods
or services directly rather than giving borrowers cash, the borrower would often
have to return to sign a form stating the work had been performed to a satisfactory
standard.49
The novelty of Title I insured loans was that they were made with no collateral
security, no co-signer, and paid off in equal monthly installments.50 In addition to
the promise of insurance, the FHA attempted to mitigate lender worries at
undertaking these risks by capping loans at $2000. That 6433 of the 10,029 approved
lenders actually ended up participating in Title I suggests that these measures

41. Id. at 26.
42. Id. at 23.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Hyman, supra note 3, at 100, citing a report by Irvin Bussing, a New York State Savings
Bank Association economist.
46. Id. at 107.
47. COPPOCK, supra note 36, at 24–26.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. HYMAN, supra note 3, at 116.
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succeeded at alleviating lenders’ fears.51 On the other hand, certain lenders found
Title I more appealing than others, as 84% of the number and volume of loans
could be attributed to only 10% of participating lenders.52
To keep loans affordable for consumers, the FHA limited finance charges on
Title I loans to 5%, reflecting a true interest rate of about 9.7% per annum on the
unpaid balance.53 The 5% limit included fees for the loan but not late fees. Data
from Title I’s initial run between 1934 and 1937 reveal the average size of all notes
issued was $386, the average length of the loan thirty months, the average monthly
payment $11, and the average time payment charge of $49.54 By comparison, an
inflation calculator from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that a monthly
payment of $11 in September 1934 would be the equivalent buying power of
approximately $204.18 in September 2018.55
While the statutory maximum length of loans was five years, over 95% of all
loans during Title I’s initial run were for thirty-six months or less and over 75% of
early loans were for under $300.56 This information supports the contention that
the averages cited above are reflective of the true experience of lenders and
borrowers in mid-1930s and are not being distorted by a few extreme outliers.
Although only 34 of the 3074 counties in the United States had no loans
insured by the FHA under Title I, loans concentrated in a few heavily-insured
areas.57 21% of all Title I loans went to improve homes in New York, while 14%
went to California.58 In fact, 66% of all Title I loan dollars went to only ninety-eight
counties nationwide, concentrating in densely populated areas experiencing rapid
population growth and having relatively high per capita incomes.59
Title I’s Impact on the Consumer Credit Market: Title I’s ambition to offer
consumer-grade credit was so groundbreaking, the FHA had to “borrow” the
expertise of two bankers, J. Andrew Painter and Roger Steffan, from National City
Bank in New York City to help implement the program.60 At the time, National
City Bank was one of the few private banks to have a successful, albeit small,
consumer credit division, sustained more by its popularity as a community relations
tool than for its profitability. In fact, Steffan’s boss at National City Bank was the
head of public relations, reinforcing their view that consumer loans were a publicity
stunt first and a business opportunity second.61

51. COPPOCK, supra note 36, at 6.
52. Id. at 5.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 7–8.
55. CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=11&year1=
193412&year2=201809 [ https://perma.cc/KC3H-EGHR ] ( last visited Mar. 8, 2019 ).
56. COPPOCK, supra note 36, at 8.
57. Id. at 7.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 98.
61. Id.
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From a business perspective, National City Bank’s perspective is
understandable, as small consumer loans cost banks as much to administer as large
loans and tended to yield less profit. At 5% interest, Title I could not likely have
drawn the attention or enthusiasm of the banking sector prior to the Depression,
when commercial loans yielded far better returns.62 Thus, the Great Depression’s
disruption to the natural order of banks’ lending primarily to businesses likely
contributed to the rise of Title I and consumer loans in general.
Banks benefitted institutionally from Title I. Many financial institutions had
idle staff due to waning commercial lending activity, and servicing Title I loans
provided a profitable diversion for these employees. Later, when consumer loans
became established in the financial sector, banks would build upon this
infrastructure to develop fully-fledged consumer credit departments that expanded
beyond the limited purposes of Title I.63
Contemporary research by Joseph D. Coppock on behalf of the National
Bureau of Economic Research casts doubt on whether the program stimulated
lending or the construction industry as intended.64 While Title I insurance offered
lenders the safety net65 to take a risk on making small, short-term, amortized
consumer credit loans with no down payment,66 bankers may have found consumer
loans attractive for other reasons independent of the FHA’s insurance—namely,
because they were small and had a high repayment rate.67 Consumer credit loans
under Title I offered lenders a higher-interest, short-term investment to offset their
lower-interest, long-term lending portfolios.68 Louis Hyman notes in Debtor Nation
that lenders rarely used the FHA’s insurance provisions,69 and contemporary data
confirms this claim, revealing that only about 5.8% of all Title I notes (3.4% of the
aggregate dollar volume) between 1934 and 1937 had claims paid against them.70
Even if Title I’s effectiveness as a stimulus is debatable, it likely popularized
the consumer grade credit loan in banking circles and created supply-side
competition in the untapped consumer credit market.71 Indeed, the FHA’s
popularization of consumer credit—not its insurance—may have been its most
valuable contribution to the consumer credit market. Once the specter of the
Depression receded and the post-World War II building boom commenced,

62. Id. at 97.
63. Id. at 103.
64. COPPOCK, supra note 36.
65. HYMAN, supra note 3, at 102.
66. Id. at 105.
67. Id. at 102.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. COPPOCK, supra note 36, at 8. Note: these statistics do not account for money paid by
borrowers to the Government once it assumed the debt.
71. Id. at 5 (citing statements by then-Federal Housing Director Stewart McDonald’s testimony
before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency in 1936).
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consumer loans became an increasingly important and ubiquitous feature of the
American credit landscape.72
As financial institutions became more savvy to consumer loan best practices
and sought profit through volume of sales, the process to apply for consumer loans
became more data-driven and impersonal.73 Inspired by the Ford assembly line,
lenders began seeking a quick, accurate loan approval system that could find
borrowers who were, on average, reliable enough to create profit.74 In this way, the
general consumer credit market that Title I spawned evolved to meet growing
consumer demand for small-dollar, short-term loans.
Likewise, Title I itself evolved, ensuring its survival to the present. The
individual loan limits, aggregate budgetary limits, and improvement parameters of
Title I changed over the years, ebbing and flowing with the policy goals of
subsequent administrations.75 Simultaneously, the definition of acceptable
renovation and modernization projects grew to include purchasing refrigerators, gas
and oil heaters, and other upgrades;76 conversion of property to multifamily
dwellings, governmental uses, or commercial uses;77 and slum clearance and
rehabilitation. Eventually, Title I grew to embrace mobile homes and prefabricated
homes.
The FHA transformed the consumer credit market by lowering its risks and
enabling banks, finance companies, and credit card companies to profit from
consumer loans for the first time. However, once the Title II provisions fueled the
creation of the robust consumer credit market, the federal guarantees were no
longer needed, and the market moved forward on its own momentum. Interest rates
on small consumer loans fell because the market shared the risk, and no individual
seller was implicated. If FHA home loans created suburban life, that life was
enhanced by consumer loans that allowed the new middle-class to purchase luxuries
like cars, appliances, and apparel. The consumer credit market for whites shifted
from the rigid and expensive installment lending model to the flexible and less
expensive “revolving credit” model enabled by the credit card. Credit card
companies allowed borrowers to “revolve” their debt, or roll over their balances,
for the first time. Credit cards also gave borrowers flexibility in purchasing and
72. HYMAN, supra note 3, at 99.
73. Id. at 100.
74. Id. at 106.
75. See generally Grace Milgram, HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FIN. AND URBAN AFFAIRS, A
Chronology of Housing Legislation and Selected Executive Actions, 1892–1992 (Dec. 1993), https://
www.huduser.gov/portal//publications/pdf/HUD-11661.pdf [ https://perma.cc/B5XW-GRPB ].
76. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., Fixing up Your Home and How to Finance It,
HUD.GOV, https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/sfh/title/sfixhs [ https://perma.cc/
GEK3-SLN2 ] ( last visited May 14, 2019 ).
77. Milgram, supra note 75; U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., Manufactured Home Loan
Insurance (Title I), https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/sfh/title/manuf14 [ https://
perma.cc/86PJ-B49F ] ( last visited Mar. 8, 2019 ). Note: mobile and manufactured homes were
considered personal and not real property when these measures were added to Title I in the late 1969.
Id.
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significantly expanded purchasing power because they could be used at a variety
of retailers.78
Most of these consumer loans went toward making purchases that made life
easier and more enjoyable, but credit also created a buffer to protect wealth and
livelihood against life’s unpredictable tumults. Credit card and finance companies
avoided redlined neighborhoods due to both racism and their risk-prone economy.
These communities relied on extractive installment credit that came coupled with
instability and continued poverty.79 This was another instance in which the New
Deal credit reforms created a wealth-producing credit market for whites and an
inescapable debt trap for blacks. According to historian Louis Hyman, “[T]he
modern credit system of the twentieth century was built by white men for white
men, leaving other Americans to borrow in older, more expensive and dangerous
ways.”80 The credit system did not just build wealth for whites, but it “constrained
the credit options for poor, urban African Americans [in ways that] would have
been inconceivable for the rest of America.”81
Changes to Banking Regulation
New Deal banking reforms brought about federal governance of banks
through newly created agencies that administered new restrictions, limits, and
chartering requirements. Most significant of these reforms was federal deposit
insurance, which effectively ended runs on banks and allowed banks to survive
panics. Insurance subsidies came coupled with heavy government restrictions. The
Glass Steagall Act of 1933 and the National Bank Act of 1935 restricted bank
activities, capped interest rates, and reduced risks.82 These laws also capped bank
size, restricted conglomeration, and imposed branching restrictions, which enabled
small community banks to survive and thrive.
All of these laws and subsidies created a nation of small community banks.
The rationale of favoring community banking over large conglomerate banks was
that smaller banks would favor the weak as opposed to the strong and that capital
would remain within a region allowing communities to invest their savings in local
projects. Small community banks were inherently less stable than larger
conglomerates because their stability depended on a single community’s economy.
Markets naturally favored large conglomerate banks that could diversify their risks

78. Id. at 10–72 (showing Louis Hyman’s explanation that in the post-war credit economy, the
“lines of race would definitively cross lines of class.”); see also Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve,
Address at the Economic Development Conference of the Greenlining Institute (Oct. 11, 1997).
79. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 10–72.
80. Id. at 7.
81. Id.
82. See 12 U.S.C. § 264 (transferred to 12 U.S.C. §1811); McFadden Act of 1927, 12 U.S.C. § 36
(repealed 1994) (prohibiting branching across state lines); FEDERAL RESERVE HISTORY,
S. REP. NO. 473, 69th CONG., at 6 (1st Sess.). The FDIC was created by the Glass Steagall Act and
made permanent by the Banking Act of 1935. Federal Reserve History, Banking Act of 1933,
§ 12B. (a), at 7.
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and move their funds and investments to their most profitable markets, which was
usually Wall Street. These laws and protections were meant to counteract the natural
markets. Larger banks had better access to liquidity and capital from a wide selection
of robust financial markets. Smaller banks were constrained to investments in only
their communities. Federal deposit insurance stabilized and supported community
banks through federal subsidies. This is why the small bankers of the South and the
Democratic Party that supported them fought for it.
With deposit insurance, small community banks could profit from their
control over a community’s resources while the federal government protected them
from the constant failure and runs that besieged their industry up until that point.
Yet localism was supplemented by the mammoth nationalized mortgage market
enabled by the FHA.83 The post-New Deal period was thus the golden age for
community banks. The FHA guaranteed their loans, FDIC insurance prevented
runs, and federal reserve liquidity protection saved them from a regional credit
crunch. The federal government created the market for “small, community”
banking.84
Civil Rights Protests Against Credit Markets
During the capital-building and prosperous decades of the 1940s to the 1960s
fueled by the mixed economy, black communities were lending and borrowing in a
laissez faire credit market.85 Before the press and the nation focused on Martin
Luther King’s Civil Rights coalition, activists and community groups were
protesting against exploitative credit and exclusionary lending transactions. The first
protest led by blacks against white businesses occurred in Harlem in 1935.86 The
83. The banking industry debate between large and small banks mirrored the age-old national
divide between industrial interests and agricultural interests. Bankers in the North wanted more
permissive banking laws that allowed banks to readily expand and operate across several regions.
Bankers in the South and West were concerned that expansive Northern banking conglomerates would
pull capital from across the country due to the amount of services those banks already provided and
drive regional banks out of business. Roosevelt sided with the South and West and successfully
advocated for anti-competitive banking laws to protect regional banks. With Roosevelt on their side,
Southern states fought for FDIC insurance, which made small banking possible. See CHARLES
CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BANKING
CRISES AND SCARCE CREDIT 16, 191 (2014).
84. See Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73–6 (1933) (legislation explicitly prohibited bank
conglomeration or branching of any kind and emphasized unit banking).
85. See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 23–24 (2014); see also
ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH 14 (2016). Modern research by
Thomas Piketty, Robert Gordon, and others shows that the era from the New Deal until 1970 was an
exceptional era of prosperity and wealth equality in American history; this boom was a temporary boost
to middle-class wealth and standard of living.
86. See Stephen Robertson, Lecture at the German Historical Institute: Toward a Spatial
Narrative of the 1935 Harlem Riot: Mapping and Storytelling after the Geospatial Turn (Oct. 20, 2016),
in http://drstephenrobertson.com/presentation/toward-a-spatial-narrative-of-the-1935-harlem-riot
[ https://perma.cc/D2LJ-7GX6 ]; see also Stephen Robertson, Lecture at the National Council on Public
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spark was lit when a teenage shoplifter was beaten by a store owner. The protest
turned into violence, in a precursor of future events, rioters destroyed white
business establishments while sparing black-owned businesses.87 Most race riots
before the Great Depression were white-led riots against blacks, so this was a
change, though violent protests were rare. In northern cities, collective action was
beginning to coalesce around specific economic demands in segregated black
ghettos. These protesters focused on discriminatory hiring practices and
exploitation by white lenders who sold goods at high interest with heavy markups.88
These early efforts were focused on local and state action and enjoyed a few crucial
victories. Harlem community groups persuaded the New York state legislature to
enact consumer-protecting legislation that curtailed some of the most onerous
contract terms provided by lenders.89
One side of the protests focused on encouraging more black businesses and
called for “Bigger and Better Negro Business.”90 This movement was being waged
by local black organizations that spanned the political spectrum from radical black
nationalists to the conservative National Business League.91 Another strand of
collective action with the slogan “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” demanded
that white businesses operating in the ghetto hire more black workers. These groups
put pressure on local businesses using boycotts.92 Adam Clayton Powell emerged as
the most vocal leader of the boycott movement and several years later, formed the
“Greater New York Coordinating Committee for Employment” aimed at securing
jobs through nonviolent protest.93
In 1935, several white merchants challenged a black boycott of their Baltimore
businesses in the Maryland Court of Appeals.94 The court ruled in favor of the
boycotting community groups stating that the black community had “an

History Conference in Baltimore: Mapping a Riot: Harlem, 1935 (Mar. 19, 2016), http://
drstephenrobertson.com/presentation/mapping-a-riot-harlem-1935 [ https://perma.cc/2QM38NLP ].
87. Supra note 86.
88. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL
WEALTH GAP 315 n.18 (2017).
89. See ANNE FLEMING, CITY OF DEBTORS (2018).
90. ABRAM HARRIS, THE NEGRO AS CAPITALIST 177 (2010).
91. See THOMAS BAUMAN, THE PEKIN: THE RISE AND FALL OF CHICAGO’S FIRST BLACK
OWNED THEATER 24 (2014).
92. See Albon Holsey, Business Manager, Crisis, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS
IN COLORED SCHOOLS at Jackson, Miss. (July 1929) (explaining that the Harlem Labor Union made
up of former Garveyites, had picketed white stores that refused to hire blacks in the 1932 “Don’t Buy
Where You Can’t Work” movement. Soon black leaders across the country began talking about
leveraging the “purchase power” of the black dollar to fight discrimination.).
93. See CHERYL GREENBERG, “OR DOES IT EXPLODE?”: BLACK HARLEM IN THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 135 (1997).
94. See Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421 (Ct. Spec. App. 1935).
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unquestionable right” to present their cause “in a peaceable way.”95 The judge even
seemed to be encouraging black protestors to “persuade white employers to engage
colored employees” and to orchestrate boycotts of those who did not “by
organization, public meetings, propaganda and by personal solicitation.” 96 In a
troubling twist, however, the court seemed to put the onus on the black community
to achieve their demands stating that “whether they succeed or fail will depend on
the cooperation of their people.” 97 The subtext seemed to be that it was the
responsibility of the black population to work to end racism. The ruling set the stage
for the civil rights movement’s early strategy of leveraging black market power and
using organized boycotts against Jim Crow buses in Montgomery, Alabama.
By the 1960s, black poverty was deeply entrenched, but more importantly, it
was marked by its stark contrast to the white middle-class’s prosperity.98 Not only
had the majority of black families not ridden the postwar economic boom;
conditions in the ghetto had actually worsened.99 By the early 1980s, almost half of
black children lived in poverty in contrast with less than 15% of white children.100
Black families had less than one-fifth the wealth of white families. The Federal
Reserve studied the racial wealth gap in 1967 and concluded that “the evidence
appears overwhelming that the net wealth position of black families is substantially
poorer than that of white families of similar characteristics.” 101 For whites and
blacks earning more than $20,000 a year in 1967, whites had a net wealth of $100,009
and blacks had $30,195. At the bottom, for incomes less than $2499 a year, whites
had $10,681 and blacks had $2148.102 The Federal Reserve study concluded that the
source of the wealth gap was historic inequalities in income and opportunities, “a
legacy of past economic deprivation,” which would not be fixed even if the income
gap was eliminated. It could only be closed by a reversal of past privileges. A
separate study on black wealth explained that the reason for the large wealth gap
had nothing to do with black savings patterns. In fact, “the bulk of consumption
studies show[ed] that blacks saved more at any given level of income.” The study
95. Id. This case was followed by New Negro All. v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938),
in which the Supreme Court held that blacks were allowed to picket businesses that employed an
all-white staff under principles of labor law.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY
THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 269 (1977) (explaining that “Blacks became more indignant over
their condition—not only as oppressed racial minority in a white society but as poor people in an
affluent one.”).
99. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 140–64 (2012).
100. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES: PEOPLE AND FAMILIES –
1959 TO 2017, tbl. 3, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/
historical-poverty-people.html [ https://perma.cc/6YFQ-WCJA ] ( last updated Aug. 28, 2018 ).
101. Henry S. Terrell, Wealth Accumulation of Black and White Families: The Empirical Evidence,
26 J. FIN. 377 (1971).
102. See RICHARD STERNER, THE NEGRO’S SHARE: A STUDY OF INCOME, CONSUMPTION,
HOUSING, AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 93 (1943); see also Terrell, supra note 101.
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concluded that “these rather stark findings on wealth accumulation suggest that
economic equality for black families will not be achieved when the current annual
income gap between black and white families is eliminated because a considerable
wealth gap will remain as a legacy of past economic deprivation.”103 The wealth and
opportunity gap would continue unabated without direct government action—in
other words, something more than just stopping racial discrimination.
While the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were in
fact the beginning of historic changes that continue today, they were also the highwater mark of the civil rights movement. As soon as the acts were passed, it was
apparent that the laws did nothing to remedy past wrongs—they were not designed
to do so. The Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act finally guaranteed the
black population the same rights they had already been granted in the 14th and 15th
Amendments passed 100 years earlier. Even these laws would have been disregarded
had they not been supported by Supreme Court decrees and, more importantly,
federal troops. The South was just as adamant about fighting the decrees of
Congress in the 1960s as it had been in the 1860s. Only this time, the federal
government forced compliance and eventually got it. The doors of the white only
schoolhouse and voting stations were opened, but what could be done about the
redlined ghettos and the effects of centuries of exclusion and poverty? The decree
of equal protection before the law was ineffective as a remedy to this history. In
fact, it stood as a barrier to it, for how could the federal government remedy its
race-based laws without new race-based laws? Soon, claims of racial discrimination
would be used to block and contest all government attempts at race-based remedies
and affirmative action.
Blacks were still unemployed at twice the rate of whites, they occupied low
wage jobs, had little wealth, and these momentous laws provided no conceivable
path out of poverty.104 Abolishing racist laws was not the same thing as achieving
equality. Ending segregation was not the same thing as integration. Ending job
discrimination was not the same thing as having jobs. Ending credit discrimination
was not the same thing as providing credit. A legal right to equality was meaningless
to the destitute and marginalized unless it could chart a path to actual equality. The
movement shifted toward “achieving the fact of equality” as Bayard Rustin wrote
in 1965, rather than merely “removing the barriers to full opportunity.”105 If it was
true, according to Rustin, that “freedom must be conceived in economic
categories,” the civil rights movement turned its focus to achieving justice as an

103.
104.

Terrell, supra note 101.
See LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND
CONTROVERSY 11 (1967) (quoting “The year 1965,” according to Lee Rainwater and William Yancey,
“may be known in history as the time when the civil rights movement discovered, in this sense of
becoming explicitly aware, that abolishing legal racism would not produce Negro equality.”).
105. Bayard Rustin, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement,
39 COMMENT. 3564, 3566 (1965).
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economic matter.106 The exploitative effects of housing segregation in the North
were sown through legal contracts and bureaucratic zoning. Intractable poverty and
inequality were just as oppressive as the South’s brute hostility but a far less visible
problem to address. However, it had to be addressed in order to achieve racial
equality. Urban ghettos were zones with fewer public resources such as quality
schools, roads, hospitals, universities, and infrastructure.107 The segregated ghetto
contained too little capital to appreciate, and its main export, labor, struggled to find
work as industries left America’s cities for the less costly suburbs before eventually
moving offshore.108
These trends were self-reinforcing. White flight included not just
homeowners, but their consumer power, and ultimately led to the drain of
investment and business funds. The decline of the inner city was not just a
byproduct of racial segregation, but had to do with the decline of industrial
manufacturing in the inner city. Large industrial plants either moved to the suburbs,
closed up shop, or moved abroad. These trends led to higher joblessness in the
inner city and counterintuitively to increased costs. The state of the ghetto was one
of high prices and general deterioration—it was expensive to be poor and
isolated.109 Suburban retailers could lower costs due to their access to an
economically diverse set of customers and higher sales volume. Small businesses
charged more for products because of their lower sales volumes and higher
operating costs (due to the isolation of the ghetto). The black inner-city economy

106. See Bayard Rustin, Funding Full Citizenship, 6 COUNCIL J. 3 (1967).
107. See CARO, supra note 3, at 20 (explaining that even urban renewal programs that upgraded
and revived America’s cities in the 1960s did so at the black population’s expense. James Baldwin
referred to “urban renewal” programs as “negro removal,” for the effect of urban architects like Robert
Moses was that highways and roads built through ghettos pushed, packed, and divided black residents
into increasingly overcrowded and under-resourced neighborhoods.).
108. See FRANK G. DAVIS, THE ECONOMICS OF BLACK COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: AN
ANALYSIS AND PROGRAM FOR AUTONOMOUS GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (1972) (noting that the
“condition of economic stagnation and decay in the black ghettos of America is not self-correcting
within the price system. Rather, the pull of economic forces sets up a permanent condition of inequality
between a low-income labor-intensive black economy and the rest of the economy.”).
109. Ed Glaeser, Ghettos: The Changing Consequences of Ethnic Isolation, 7 REGIONAL
REV. (1997), https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/regional-review/1997/spring/ghettos-thechanging-consequences-of-ethnic-isolation.aspx [ https://perma.cc/939Z-629X ]. Note: Despite its
negative connotations, I have chosen to use the term “ghetto” for several reasons, First, during the
crucial years of reform and protest, the black activists across the political spectrum as well as the
reformers and academics addressing the credit issues covered herein used the term “ghetto” to describe
segregated black neighborhoods. Second, and more crucially, the alternative terms “black
neighborhood” or “inner city” do not accurate connote the history of these black spaces. “Black
neighborhood” is a term that erases the creation of these spaces. These areas were not chosen
voluntarily by their residents—strict racial segregation has been a constant. And this racial segregation
was enforced through violence—both state and private—and law—both private contract law, zoning,
and legislation. The term ghetto may not be the right terminology, but to me it draws attention to the
conditions of its formation through violence, law, and cohesion. I agree with critics of the word when
it is used as a description for subpar goods or conditions, which is a modern usage of the term. I have
not used the word ghetto in that way in this article and believe it is that usage that has burdened the
term with associations of stigma and racism.
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was a uniquely destructive mix of negative forces that impeded the economic
mobility of the residents. In 1965, Kenneth Clark described the “dark ghettoes” as
“social, political, educational, and—above all—economic colonies.”110 Though
Clark was not a black nationalist, the black nationalist movement viewed the
segregation of the ghetto through the prism of anti-colonization movements
abroad. The ghetto did not resemble a colony in many ways, but one could be
forgiven for drawing the analogy when observing the drastically different economies
in the “dark ghetto” in contrast to the white suburbs.
Moreover, just like the violence that accompanied the anti-colonialization
fights abroad, a violent resistance also ignited in the U.S. ghettos. This resistance
was unlike anything the U.S. populace had experienced heretofore.111 A CBS TV
broadcast announced, “This was not a riot. It was an insurrection against all
authority.”112 Johnson deployed the National Guard with military equipment to deal
with the civil insurgency.113 Doug McAdams’s study of the civil rights movement
after 1965 explained, “It would not seem an overstatement to argue that the level
of open defiance of the established economic and political order was as great during
this period as during any other in the country’s history, save the Civil War.”114
Sixteen days after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Harlem erupted in
violence. Five days after President Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
the Watts district in Los Angeles exploded in a deadly riot that killed and injured
many and destroyed millions of dollars’ worth of property. Watts had been
thoroughly segregated over the preceding decades, making poverty concentrated
and extreme.115 One in three people in Watts were unemployed, all but a single
industrial plant had abandoned the Los Angeles district, and rioters targeted white
property as they channeled their anger toward their perceived exploiters—white
absentee property owners, pawn shops, and grocery stores. In Chicago’s West Side,
rioters claimed that they wanted to “drive white ‘exploiters’ out of the ghetto.”116
Though rioting and looting in some places seemed like a random and ragefueled destruction of imprecise orientation, observers noted that there were typically
specific targets. Generally, rioters directed their pent up anger specifically at ghetto

110. See KENNETH B. CLARK, DARK GHETTO: DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL POWER 11 (1965).
111. See Paul C. Tullier, School Dropouts Build Explosive Unemployment in Ranks of Youth,
KAN. CITY TIMES, May 3, 1963, at 38.
112. See GERALD HORNE, FIRE THIS TIME: THE WATTS UPRISING AND THE 1960S, at 36
(1997).
113. See ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE
MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 71 (2016) (explaining that Gov. Jerry Brown called
the rioters “terrorists” and promised to deal with them “forcefully”).
114. See JOHN SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE,
AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA 73 (1996).
115. See Joseph A. Califano, Report of the President’s Task Force on the Los Angeles Riots 6
(Aug. 11–15, 1965) in folder Califano Los Angeles Riots, Ramsey Clark Report, in box 47, in Office
Files of Joseph A. Califano (accessed at Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library).
116. See DAVID GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 439 (1986).
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lenders.117 The Washington Post reported that the stores that sold on credit were the
“most popular victims of the riots.”118 Upon studying these accounts, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) concluded that rioters were in fact engaged in “selective
burning and looting” of stores they felt “had treated them unfairly” and that these
rioters went to the lenders “not to loot, but to destroy the credit records of the
stores they burned. This was their solution to oppressive debt.”119 Stores were seized
by rioters who destroyed the records (books) on which their debts were recorded.
Journalists reported crowds chanting “burn the damn records;” a mother told
looters at a grocery store, “Don’t grab the groceries, grab the book.”120 The protest
against unequal interest and contract terms was the Birmingham struggle of the
northern ghetto. However, this protest did not capture the national attention as did
the fight between Bull Connor’s dogs and clubs and the peaceful children marching
in the South. One could be captured on the New York Times front page to expose
the brutality of Southern Jim Crow, the lawlessness of the Southern justice system,
and the obvious moral rectitude of the civil rights movement. The other—the riots,
the destruction of property, the opaque legal mechanisms of the installment
contract and debt financing—was not picture-worthy or easy to understand.
Nevertheless, the Jim Crow credit market was also rooted in centuries of racial
discrimination, and its eradication was just as necessary to the realization of the
country’s democratic ideals.
THE POOR PAY MORE
By the 1960s, credit card transactions were ubiquitous in American life and
the nature of credit was separate and unequal. Credit cards did not cross the redlines
of the ghetto and installment credit was almost unheard of in the middle-class white
suburbs. Black buyers made almost every large purchase with high-cost installment
credit, where the purchases were paid back over time with high additional interest
costs. Even some small purchases, like groceries, doctor visits, and encyclopedias,
were bought on installment credit.121 Black families across all income levels had
more debt than whites and paid higher interest.122

117. See Consumer Credit and the Poor 1: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong. 2d Sess. 5 (1968) [hereinafter Consumer Credit and the Poor 1]; see also HYMAN, supra note 3,
at 194.
118. See Murray Seeger, Washington Ghetto Smoldering Ruins Block After Block, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 1968, at 18.
119. See Federal Trade Commission Report on Credit Practices: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on
Fin. Insts. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 18, 22 (1968).
120. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 180.
121. See DAVID CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE: CONSUMER PRACTICES OF
LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 49–57 (1967) (explaining that the most common purchases were appliances
and furniture and because families living in unstable housing in the ghettos moved more often, they
bought more furniture).
122. See Andrew Brimmer, Small Business and Economic Development in the Negro Community, in
BLACK BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 165–68 (1971).
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In the 1964 study The Poor Pay More, Columbia professor David Caplovitz
described the ghetto debt market as a “deviant one in which exploitation and fraud
are the norm rather than the exception.”123 Specifically, he found that New York
ghetto residents paid much higher prices—“unbelievably” high according to the
author—for goods than anywhere else. These customers were not buying more
goods than the average consumer or even relying more on credit, but they obtained
“considerably less value for their dollar.”124 Another 1968 study conducted by the
FTC reported that 93% of the sales in the black ghetto were on installment
compared with only 27% in white suburbia. The FTC’s study, which was also
labeled “The Poor Pay More,” calculated that for $100 of goods, the poor paid $300
compared to $150 paid by those buying from general retailers outside the ghetto.125
The FTC report also found costs in the ghetto to be higher across the board for
housing, food, and general services.126 The FTC called these results “disturbing.”127
This “disturbing” price of credit had to do with the distinct ghetto credit
market that had developed as a result of credit redlining. Large retailers did not
operate within the ghetto, so most purchases were financed at the same store that
sold the goods.128 Because these consumers were a “captive market,” there was no
price competition among these retailers. Lenders courted customers through
advertising, promises of easy credit, and door-to-door salesmanship.129 Borrowers
fell into a continuous debt relationship with these merchants, a situation
appropriately described as an “urban sharecropping system.”130
Loan default was common and occurred at much higher rates than in the
suburbs. Financial instability created by poverty and wage irregularities was partially
responsible. But the higher cost of credit was also to blame. Resentment contributed
to the instability as well. Ghetto retailers sold shoddy merchandise at high prices.131
Senator William Proxmire, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, believed
that resentment and frustration also played a part in the higher default rate.
Proxmire noted that these retailers often sold goods that were fraudulently
described as in better condition than they were, which frustrated borrowers. When
the appliance stopped working, Proxmire explained, “many [borrowers] stop
making payments.”132 The high default led to immediate problems with
repossession and threats of criminal penalties, but also led to future restrictions of

123. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 121, at xvii.
124. See id. at 81, 88, 96–97, 107–09, 16–17, 90–91, 110–12, 119, 125 (explaining that even
among inner city borrowers, blacks paid more for credit than did whites).
125. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL
SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS, at IX (1968).
126. See Consumer Credit and the Poor 1, supra note 117, at 9–10.
127. Id. at 3–4.
128. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 121, at 49–57.
129. Id. at 58–80.
130. Id. at 25, 100.
131. Id. at 21.
132. See Consumer Credit and the Poor 1, supra note 117, at 7.
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credit for ghetto borrowers and higher costs for all the retailers who spent money
on collections and repossession.
Contract defaults often entailed repossession, wage garnishments, court
judgments, and even shakedowns by lenders, all of which were unimaginable for
suburban lenders. 133 Job loss could lead to default on a furniture loan, but a missed
payment could also lead to job loss because it was common for an employer to fire
an employee whose wages were garnished in order to avoid the hassle of paying
more than one person and to keep a streamlined system.134 Moreover, law
enforcement and the court system were a part of the black credit system and thereby
added the risk of criminal sanctions to credit transactions.135 Ghetto lenders were
the face of exploitation, humiliation, shame, and injustice, so it is unsurprising that
they were the first targets of the violence.
However, these lenders were not the direct cause of the inequality and
exploitation in the ghetto. This is not to say that merchants were not taking
advantage of the poor. They were. There was predatory behavior, misleading
advertisements, misrepresentation of prices, bait-and-switch advertising and sales,
and fraud to be sure, but the ghetto’s destructive economic undertow trapped both
the high-interest lenders as well as the borrowers. 136 Several studies, including
contemporary studies by the FTC, Congress, and other academics, as well as recent
analysis by historians, show that these lenders were not even making high profits.137
The poor paid more and the sellers made less. Historian Louis Hyman found that
“between bad debt losses, lawyers’ collection fees, higher insurance premiums, more
accounting staff, and higher sales commissions, the higher costs of ghetto retailers
accounted for 94 percent of the difference in the gross margins.”138 Poverty,
segregation, and exclusion from robust credit markets meant high costs, low profits,
and higher risks for everyone. Prices were high, quality was low, and profits were
deceptively scarce.
These lenders had higher loan losses and collection costs in the ghetto than
they did in the suburbs because black families did not have a broad wealth
infrastructure that whites enjoyed. These costs included hiring repo men and taking
customers to court for unpaid bills. These collection tactics and the “unbelievably”
133. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 181.
134. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 121, at 157.
135. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 125, at 33–34 (describing how eleven low-income
market retailers obtained 2,690 judgments in 1966 resulting in 1,568 garnishments and 306
repossessions. General market retailers reported only seventy judgments for the same year. The
low-income retailers had one suit for every $2,599 of their net sales. The general market retailers
averaged one suit for every $232,299 of sales.).
136. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 121, at 179–92 (Caplovitz himself had misunderstood this
dynamic and, when he offered reflections in the 1967 reprint of The Poor Pay More, he conceded that it
was a mistake to see the ghetto credit merchants as “nefarious exploiters of the poor” and believed that
a more thorough analysis could reveal more about the “economic constraints that operate on these
men”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 125.
137. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 181.
138. See id. at 193.
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high merchandise prices these lenders charged caused much suffering for
borrowers, but they also cut into the lenders’ margins. They had to hire more staff,
lost more money on default, and paid more to finance their own businesses—all
these costs were passed on to borrowers.
Situating these lenders in the broader framework makes the disparity even
more striking. The cost of credit is related to the risk of lending. The higher the risk
of default, the higher the interest rate. However, this is not a one-way causal link.
Higher interest can make a loan higher to repay and therefore lead to higher default
regardless of the risks associated with the borrower. Moreover, loan costs are not
perfectly matched with the borrower’s ability to repay. Taking an analogy to today’s
credit markets, all payday lenders charge the same high rate of interest to their
borrowers. A hedge fund manager walking into Cash America would get the same
300% APR loan as would a Wal-Mart employee. Of course, a hedge fund manager
will not need an emergency loan of $500 because he can “borrow” the cash from
his own holdings at no cost at all. If he is truly cash-poor, perhaps he could use his
social capital to borrow $500 again at no cost from his network of wealthy friends
or family. These are crude generalizations, but they largely match the demographic
data of the wealthy and the poor—the wealthy tend to have wealthy friends and
family and the poor tend to have similarly poor social networks. Thus, the cost of
credit differs for the hedge fund manager and the Wal-Mart employee not because
of the underwriting of the lender they go to, but because they have access to
different types of lenders. A hedge fund employee, if he is going to borrow, will
borrow large sums of money either from the Capital Markets, his investors, or the
Federal Reserve if he owns a bank.139 These loans will likely not even be loans, but
bond sales, equity transfers, or just investments. The American poet Ogden Nash
put it this way: “[O]ne rule which woe betides the banker who fails to heed it; Never
lend any money to anybody unless they don’t need it.”140
On the other end of the income ladder, the poor pay most for small sums of
credit. Due to a variety of forces, including bank conglomeration, redlining, and the
deregulation of state usury laws, poor communities do not have access to small
credit from banks. As such, their only option for a loan is to borrow from a highcost title lender, payday lender, or pawn broker. This is the market in which they
operate. To take an example in the middle, a middle-class office worker who wants
to purchase a second car has an altogether different credit market to which she can
turn than the hedge fund manager or the minimum wage employee. She can take
out a home equity line of credit, a small loan from her bank, or liquidate any 401(k)
stock holdings she might have at a penalty. These options cost more than what the
wealthy pay for credit—to the extent they even need it—and much less than what
the poor pay. A home equity loan costs less than 10% APR and can be structured
139. MEHRA BARADARAN, HOW THE
AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (2015).

OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION,

140. Ogden Nash, Bankers Are Just Like Anybody Else, Except Richer, NEW YORKER MAG.,
Dec. 7, 1935, at 41.
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to be paid over the life of a home mortgage. Compare this to a payday loan or a title
loan that must be repaid in a short time period and whose interest rate is anywhere
from 300% of the total loan to 2000%.
Thus, ghetto residents were paying more not just because they were higher
risk borrowers, but because they operated in a higher risk credit market. Segregation
had cordoned off the riskiest borrowers. Large national chains could avoid
impoverished black neighborhoods entirely, and thus avoid the higher costs of
underwriting, servicing, and collecting, which is exactly what they were doing. But
not all of these borrowers were poor credit risks. In fact, with government insurance
akin to what had undergirded the suburban credit market, residents of inner-city
ghettos would also have been low-default borrowers. As it was, they paid more for
loans, which meant a greater debt burden, and higher default. This then cost lenders
more, further driving up prices.
Suburban consumer lenders could offer lower interest because of lower risks,
and lower risks made for more profitable lending, which drove down prices even
more. Because their loans were predictable, they could be securitized and sold into
the secondary markets, which lowered their risk even more. Higher risk and
geographic isolation, or more accurately racial segregation that led to geographic
isolation and higher risks, prevented installment lenders from participating in the
robust credit markets that were driving down credit prices in the suburbs. It was the
secondary markets that were the main engines of the credit markets, and installment
lenders did not participate in secondary markets.141 Ghetto lenders paid more for
capital because they could not sell their loans into the secondary market. The loans
were too risky because black families did not have access to the network that
lowered risks. They were stuck in an ancient debt market while the rest of the
country had taken off into the modern world of risk sharing, secondary markets,
and large finance companies that all worked to lower the risks and the costs of debt.
Meanwhile, a virtuous credit cycle had taken hold in American suburbs. But
the network did not work without all of the pieces in place. This revolving credit
market that had taken shape among retailers outside of the ghetto meant a lower
burden for customers and lower default rates. The black ghetto was not part of this
infrastructure. Americans lived in two different worlds of credit—separate and
unequal. But the equal protection provisions of the Civil Rights Acts had not been
designed to address the type of discrimination that had led to the Jim Crow credit
market. In other words, color-blind laws and legal prohibitions on de jure
discrimination did nothing to lower the costs of installment credit.
In the aftermath of the riots, the Banking and Currency Committee in the
Senate held two separate hearings to discuss the problem of the poor paying more
and what could be done about it. Senator Proxmire, a Wisconsin Democrat, led the
hearings. Proxmire was an incorruptible reformer who was as committed a

141. See Saule Omarova & Bob Hockett, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143
(2017) (analyzes how secondary markets have shaped the financial industry).
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policymaker in the cause of fixing inequalities as any other, but he was a hawk when
it came to public spending and a dogmatic believer in the power of small business
as the lifeblood of the country.142 Proxmire expressed “outrage” at the injustices
faced by ghetto consumers, and he believed that the government must play a role
in alleviating the suffering.143 Proxmire and the other members of his committee
expressed genuine puzzlement that market competition had not brought down
prices in the ghetto. Yet in testimony after testimony, government agencies,
academics, and economists explained that these lenders were not making profits
even as they charged exorbitant prices. The legislators seemed to understand that
the ghetto lending economy created a cycle of high prices and lack of competition.
They understood that the cycle must break somehow and that the “economic illness
of the ghetto” required a strong cure.144 Yet when they began to discuss the antidote,
they honed in on getting more black banks, credit unions, and lenders in the
ghetto.145
In the end, the Congressional hearings made three specific findings. First,
rioters targeted white-owned establishments.146 Second, the rioters were targeting
installment lenders.147 Congress based future policy on these first two findings. Yet
there was a third finding the report supported that Congress ignored or forgot when
it came to crafting the policy response. The third finding was that these lenders
were not profiting. It simply costs more to lend in the ghetto because of the
structure of the segregated credit market. This was the finding that each report
confirmed even as it confounded the legislators. There were no Bull Connor
lenders. They were no George Baileys, but they were not predators. However, the
policymakers, intending no ill will, but lacking a political mandate, urged policies
that ignored these findings. Without addressing this finding, Congress’s response
was to keep the Jim Crow market intact and to throw more lenders into its maw, as
though the lender’s race would somehow change the fundamental economy.
In the end, after hearing testimony to the contrary, the senators misdiagnosed
the problem in ghetto lending as one of white institutions exploiting the black
ghetto. While “white-owned stores were burned and looted,” said New York
Republican Senator Jacob Javits, “‘soul brother’ establishments were spared.”148
Indeed, there was testimony bolstering this finding. Many black businesses even put
signs up in their windows during riots to identify themselves as “soul brother”

142. Sen. Proxmire wrote about his belief in small business. See, e.g., WILLIAM PROXMIRE, CAN
SMALL BUSINESS SURVIVE? (1964).
143. See Consumer Credit and the Poor 1, supra note 117, at 6–7.
144. Id. at 17–20.
145. See id. at 80–85; see also Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis: Hearing Before the
S. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 5, 151, 324–27
(1968) [hereinafter Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis]; U.S. SENATOR PROXMIRE REPORTS TO
YOU FROM WASHINGTON (1969), microformed on P91-4833 (Wis. Historical Soc’y).
146. Supra note 145.
147. Id.
148. See Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145.
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establishments.149 However, this was tangentially related to the problem of the Jim
Crow credit markets. Nevertheless, the senators converged on a plan to simply
throw more black banks and lenders into this unequal credit market. It was already
clear, however, that the cause of the onerous debt terms was not the lenders’ race
but the lenders’ costs. The misreading of the problem as a lack of enough black
lenders would lead to decades of misguided policy. But at least in the aftermath of
the late 1960s “urban crisis,” Congress intended for such programs to work
alongside other more robust anti-poverty measures.150
Senator Javits put forward a plan to spur black-owned small business, but he
emphasized that only a robust federal intervention aimed specifically at the ghetto
could reverse the trend of decline because “no conceivable increase in the gross
national product would stir these backwaters” without targeted assistance.151
President Johnson’s Small Business Administration (SBA) Director, Howard
J. Samuels, said that the “inner cities of this country will be dead economically” and
would remain “forever ghettos” unless blacks became “owners of American
businesses.”152 The SBA’s response was a small business lending program called
Project OWN, which ran alongside a larger War on Poverty program. Samuels
promoted a program of “compensatory capitalism” aimed at the “economic
emancipation” of the black population.153 John Jacob of the Washington Urban
League believed that credit card issuers discriminated against blacks and suggested
instead a “credit card for the poor—extended by a black credit card company in the
black community.”154
An avid believer in small business, Proxmire put his faith in credit unions.155
Proxmire introduced a bill after the hearings that he said was “designed to help the
poor break out of this vicious cycle” by “authorizing a strong federal program to
encourage the formation of credit unions and consumer counseling programs for
the poor.”156 The bill was a continuation of Project Moneywise, which created 218

149. See Michael Zweig, Black Capitalism and Ownership of Property in Harlem (Stony Brook,
Working Paper No. 16, 1970) (explaining how a study of Harlem found that more than eighty-five
percent of the businesses and properties in Harlem were owned by outsiders or nonresidents of
Harlem).
150. See Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145, at 428.
151. Id. at 9, 13.
152. Id. at 89–91.
153. Id. at 94–95; see also ROBERT WEEMS, BUSINESS IN BLACK AND WHITE 89–109 (2009)
(describing how in 1967, SBA chief, Howard J. Samuels created “Project OWN” as the government’s
minority business aid program. The program was intended to funnel loans to black and white
enterprises in ghetto areas. Though Johnson had supported the program, his heart was not into it and
it seemed that he was only using minority enterprise as “a crisis management” tool to deal with unrest.
Largely a political ploy, the program was not robust—by the end of 1968, only 5.7 percent of SBA
money went to minority businesses.).
154. See Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145, at 236.
155. Proxmire even wrote a book committed to small business. See PROXMIRE, supra note 142.
156. See U.S. SENATOR PROXMIRE REPORTS TO YOU FROM WASHINGTON, supra note 145.
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credit unions in poverty-stricken areas with the help of “indigenous leaders.”157 The
program’s director said that the goal was for these credit unions to use consumer
education and to rely on the “latent savings in the community” to build wealth.158
Of course, there were few savings, and such a plan had been tried for a hundred
years without any results.
By 1968, most of these credit unions were struggling to remain viable, and the
program was nearing its end, but Proxmire was still convinced that credit unions
were the solution. As he told the credit union industry representative, “[W]e really
count on credit unions heavily to solve a large part of this problem.” 159 After all, he
said, “[T] his is one of the purposes for which credit unions were initially established,
in order that people with modest incomes could establish credit and be able to
operate in this free enterprise economy.”160 The myth of the credit union was that
through local control of collective money, a marginalized community could
eventually gather enough capital to join the economy. But this was not actually how
credit unions had created the middle-class—they had done it through federally
subsidized mortgage loans. However, the allure of this banking model as an answer
to poverty was so strong that even the learned chair of the Senate Banking
Committee, an honest reformer who understood the forces of this deviant ghetto
market, could not break the credit union’s spell as the answer to poverty. Proxmire
knew that these urban installment lenders were not making money, a fact he
repeated many times during the hearings. He also understood that the problem’s
heart was concentrated poverty and not a few mischievous lenders’ profitable
exploitation. Yet he maintained a somewhat magical faith that locally owned credit
unions would break the “vicious cycle.” 161 Perhaps it was because any other
solution was politically impractical or cost too much, or perhaps he believed that
credit unions could overcome these obstacles through their community
commitment. To Proxmire’s credit, this was only his first proposal, with many more
to follow.
Just a few years later, Proxmire honed in on eliminating credit discrimination
and pushed for passage of the 1970 Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the 1974
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA).162 The burgeoning women’s rights
movement pushed these laws through Congress. These equal credit laws eliminated
race and gender identification from loan applications and required lenders to use
objective credit scores instead of identity. Before their passage, even affluent
women could not get a credit card. Women of means were being denied credit due
157. See Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145, at 74; see also Consumer Credit
and the Poor 1, supra note 117, at 30–38.
158. See Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145, at 74–82, 101–06; see also
Consumer Credit and the Poor 1, supra note 117, at 5–6, 34–36.
159. Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145, at 134.
160. See id. For a treatment of the Credit Union myth, see BARADARAN, supra note 139.
161. See Financial Institutions and the Urban Crisis, supra note 145, at 134.
162. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL
WEALTH GAP 149 (2017).
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solely to their gender and not their ability to repay. Wealthy black consumers also
suffered from such blatant discrimination, however, the majority of blacks suffered
from a different breed of discrimination as described above. These
antidiscrimination provisions also applied to minorities, but the exclusion of
minorities from credit was not the same as what women faced. Creditors indeed
discriminated against creditworthy women and blacks based solely on negative
stereotypes. But for blacks, discrimination created a plethora of other conditions
that materially affected their default risk. The solution to the Jim Crow credit market
was not to simply remove the “whites only” signs. Racism was the problem’s root
cause, but over decades, that racism had entrenched a segregated and
undercapitalized ghetto economy that was responsible for much of the disparity. In
order to reach parity, that economy or the segregated black ghetto itself would have
to be disassembled. Unable or unwilling to eliminate the ghetto credit market in its
entirety, Congress focused exclusively on credit application discrimination.
However, nondiscrimination laws would not and could not change the
fundamentals of the Jim Crow credit markets. Lenders simply found other means
of avoiding lending to blacks—they used zip codes as a proxy for race.163 Due to
decades of racial segregation and the subsequent reinforcement of this racial
geography through redlining, zip codes were almost perfect indicators of a
community’s racial and economic makeup.164
Misunderstanding the problem entirely, the FTC encouraged lawmakers to
create “financial education” programs so that blacks would not enter into such
exploitative contracts.165 The FTC’s own detailed study of lending disparity found
that the poor knew that they were paying too much for credit, but that they lacked
other options.166 Caplovitz also concluded his study by proposing financial
education, suggesting that ghetto consumers should be taught to shop at retailers
outside of the ghetto.167 Ultimately, Caplovitz conceded, however, that all these
suggestions would be futile “until poverty itself is eradicated.”168 Financial education
is useful insofar as consumers are making bad choices because they do not know of
better options. However, high-cost borrowing is usually a result of a lack of better
choices. In a survey of ghetto consumers, only 15% thought it was a “good idea” to
buy goods on credit.169 The rest said it was a good idea only in certain circumstances
or a bad idea altogether.170 When asked why, more than half of those surveyed said
that “it costs too much” or “you pay too much in carrying charges.”171 Though these

163. Id. at 150.
164. See HYMAN, supra note 3, at 204.
165. See Lauren Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 3, 429–34 (2011)
(analyzes the inutility of financial education programs); see also MEHRSA BARADARAN, note 139.
166. See Consumer Credit and the Poor 1, supra note 117, at 9–10.
167. See CAPLOVITZ, supra note 121, at 183–84.
168. Id. at 192.
169. Id. at 95.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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consumers seemed to understand the exact nature of their problem, they admitted
that this was “the only way poor people could buy.”172 Financial education is still
proposed as a solution to structural problems despite several convincing studies that
financial education does not work.173
In reality, all of these solutions were incomplete and shortsighted. The only
way to adequately counter credit disparity was to eliminate the wealth inequality
between the ghetto and the suburbs which would eliminate the Jim Crow credit
market. One path toward equality was to integrate the credit market, which is what
the Kerner Commission report had suggested as the only solution to the problem
of inequality.174 If black borrowers could integrate into the general market and large
retailers were allowed to do individual credit evaluations, then black borrowers
could have paid less for credit. This would have allowed lenders to diversify their
risks, thus driving down prices for everyone. Increased diversity would even have
been preferable for the large finance companies, as most lenders prefer some
borrowers who pay off their balance and many who roll over their balances and pay
interest. This is exactly what secondary markets had wrought outside of the red
lines. However, integrating a zip code-based credit market would have been difficult
to do without physical integration, which was simply not politically feasible.175
The other alternative was to give black residents a direct capital infusion to
jump-start wealth creation and break the poverty cycle directly. State law and policy
created the racial wealth gap, and so a reversal of the wealth gap through a program
of reparations would have been justifiable. But, while forced integration would have
been unfeasible and unlikely, subsidizing black communities was inconceivable.
Moreover, such a race-based redistribution of wealth had to contend with the
bedrock principle of the civil rights movement: color-blind equality. The promise
of equal protection before the law encapsulated in the Civil Rights and Voting
Rights Acts opened doors to full participation in the economy and the democracy,
but it gave the courts and legislatures the rhetorical and legal tools to close the doors
to any claims for redress of historic injustice. Colorblindness and “equality” before
the law was often used against black demands for justice. The theory is encapsulated
in Chief Justice Roberts’ statement in 2004 that “the way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis on race.”176 Demands for
racial equality taken from the theoretical underpinnings of the civil rights laws have
been used by litigants with the blessing of the Supreme Court to declare government
action attempting to address past injustice as unconstitutional.177
172. Id.
173. Willis, supra note 165, at 429–34; BARADARAN, supra note 139.
174. See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, THE KERNER REPORT (1988).
175. See BARADARAN, supra note 139, at 164–214.
176. Ilya Shapiro, The Way to Stop Discrimination on the Basis of Race Is to Stop Discrimination
on the Basis of Race, CATO AT LIBERTY (Apr. 22, 2009), https://www.cato.org/blog/way-stopdiscrimination-basis-race-stop-discriminating-basis-race [ https://perma.cc/7849-MW8P ].
177. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 531 ( 2013) (“Nearly 50 years later, things
have changed dramatically.” Shelby County contends that the preclearance requirement, even without
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BLACK CAPITALISM
During the 1968 election, each presidential candidate had a platform to
address the racial wealth gap through economic self-determination. Prior to his
assassination, Robert Kennedy was the Democratic frontrunner. Among the
candidates, his Community Development program was the most holistic.178 It
included tax incentives for businesses, Community Development Corporations, job
training programs, and government funding for poverty relief programs. Other
candidates had similar black capitalism programs. Hubert Humphrey, the eventual
Democratic candidate, called his proposal “Black Entrepreneurship: Need and
Opportunity for Government Help” and proposed plans geared towards
“enhanc[ing] black pride and quell[ing] black insurgency.”179 His plan included more
funding for businesses through the SBA programs that had been started during the
Johnson administration.180 Furthermore, his plan called for the creation of an
“urban development bank” to fund businesses in the ghetto.181 For Humphrey,
black capitalism was a part of his reform package, which included a continuation of
War on Poverty programs. In the presidential race, Humphrey referred to Nixon’s
black capitalism plan as “double talk.” When Nixon promised voters that his
program would cost little, Humphrey retorted, “Of course it will take money.
Talking about black capitalism without capital is just kiting political checks.”182
Nonetheless, Nixon’s black capitalism program was a vital part of his Southern
strategy, which used race as a wedge issue without actually talking about race.183
Other scholars have noted Nixon’s racist dog whistling on “law and order” as a
signal to attract white voters who were fearful of blacks.184 Nixon’s economic
program sought to link black poverty to welfare dependency and to resist demands
for integration or reparations by advocating “black capitalism” instead. By using the

regard to its disparate coverage, is now unconstitutional. Its arguments have a good deal of force. In
the covered jurisdictions, “‘[v]oter turnout and registration rates . . . now approach parity. Blatantly
discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. And minority candidates hold office at
unprecedented levels.’ Northwest Austin, 557 U.S., at 202, 129 S.Ct. 2504. The tests and devices that
blocked ballot access to the ballot have been forbidden nationwide for over 40 years.”). See also Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 379 (1978) (“Accordingly, we would reverse the judgment
of the Supreme Court of California holding the Medical School’s special admissions program
unconstitutional and directing respondent’s admission, as well as that portion of the judgment enjoining
the Medical School from according any consideration to race in the admissions process.”).
178. See BARADARAN, supra note 139.
179. See WEEMS, supra note 153, at 91.
180. Id. at 90–95, 107–09.
181. Id.
182. See Memorandum from Howard J. Samuels, Admin., Small Bus. Admin., to Matthew
Nimetz, Staff Assistant, Lyndon B. Johnson (Sept. 27, 1968), quoted in WEEMS, supra note 153, at 105.
183. See DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE
NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2000); see also IAN
HANEY-LOPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS HAVE WRECKED THE
MIDDLE CLASS (2014).
184. See generally LOPEZ, supra note 183; see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012).
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racially neutral rhetoric of free market capitalism, he could reject government
aid programs.
Alan Greenspan, who served as Nixon’s economic advisor, addressed claims
by black activists for reparations in a private campaign memo to candidate Nixon
in 1967 called “The Urban Riots of the 1960s.” 185 He wrote that capitalism itself
was under attack by demands made by black militants and that “ghetto riots have
become a rallying cry for an attack upon America’s system of free enterprise and
individual rights.”186 Greenspan outlined his reasoning:
The critical question is, of course, whether the Negroes are correct in
claiming that they have been exploited and that their violent reaction is the
rational response. There can be little doubt that discrimination has been
rampant. However, the charge of exploitation in the sense of value being
extracted from the Negroes without their consent for the profit of the
whites is clearly false . . . . This distinction between discrimination and
exploitation is all the difference in the world. 187
In other words, because whites had not profited directly from black misery,
reparations should be rejected. Moreover, he underscored in the memo that any
capitulation to demands for federal spending in the ghetto were a threat to free
enterprise.
Greenspan believed that the cries of exploitation were not only misguided, but
had destroyed the status of the “more moderate old-line Negro civil rights leaders”
and turned the black middle-class anti-capitalist.188 This was because black activists
had misunderstood capitalism and the natural market of the ghetto and had
erroneously and unfairly blamed whites for exploitation. He was correct when he
said that “profit rates in slum areas are doubtless distressingly low considering the
risks,” but he erred when he concluded based on that observation that the white
community was not gaining any “advantage and profit” and that therefore cries of
“injustice” were “erroneous.”189 He could not see that the same system that
discriminated against blacks had brought benefits to whites. Nor did he
acknowledge that for blacks who were being crushed by the ghetto debt trap, it
could still feel like an “injustice” even though the lenders were not making direct
profits. He rejected the liberal notion that “the Negro ghetto must be elevated to
the level of affluence of middle-class America” because “this can only be done by
massive governmental expenditures.”190 Instead, he advised Nixon to pursue
programs to “help Negroes help themselves.”191
185. See Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Townsend-Greenspan & Co., to Richard
Nixon, Republican Presidential Candidate, on the Urban Riots of the 1960s (Sept. 26, 1967) (on file
with the Richard Nixon Presidential Library).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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Capitalist theory was used to fight basic antidiscrimination laws in Milton
Friedman’s foundational 1962 book, “Capitalism and Freedom.” The intellectual
father of neoliberalism opposed such laws as a violation of free market capitalism.
He decried discrimination as a matter of bad taste but said that civil rights laws were
an “interference with the freedom of individuals to enter into voluntary contracts
with one another.”192 He compared laws prohibiting discrimination to laws
requiring discrimination—it was all unjustified government intervention. Friedman
believed that markets would themselves root out discrimination because it was
costly and inefficient. Friedman claimed that anyone who opposed buying goods
from black businessmen or employing black employees was expressing an
inefficient preference and would therefore pay a higher price for that preference.
Theoretically, this was true, but historically it was not. Because the ghetto had
cordoned off a segment of risky borrowers, whites actually paid significantly less
for goods, credit, and housing. Racial discrimination had not cost whites but had
actually brought many advantages through all-white suburbs, such as lower
competition for lucrative jobs, and for a time, even labor protections that benefited
whites at the expense of blacks.193
Friedman, Greenspan, and other market capitalists grounded their arguments
in economic theory. They were chasing a libertarian vision of the economy, but what
they were describing was a hypothetical future—it had no relationship to the actual
lived experience of American history. This was a common trope of the Chicago
school economists, which relied on models that often assumed perfect information
and rational behavior and did not account for the decision-making flaws of average
humans.194 The historical American reality was that blacks had never fully
participated in free market capitalism and that whites had benefited from heavy
government interventions that had worked to the direct disadvantage of blacks. The
arteries of trade and commerce had not flown freely through the ghetto. At least
not in the realm of credit and banking. The credit markets laid atop a federal
government apparatus including guarantees, secondary markets, deposit insurance,
and federal reserve support. The only places where those forces were not working
were inside the ghettos. The ghetto itself had been an unnatural creation of antimarket impositions of racist policies. Indeed, discrimination was incredibly costly,
but only to blacks.
The neoliberal faith in capitalism and market efficiency was rooted in an ideal
much like the egalitarian principles of the founding documents. They were
aspirational faiths, but they were not accurate descriptions of the real world. In
theory, it was costly to refuse to buy products from blacks if they were offering the

192. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 109–15 (1962).
193. Id. (explaining that the only exception was when black collective action increased the cost
of discrimination by staging wide-scale boycotts, but that was hardly what Friedman was referring to).
194. See JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKETS: A HISTORY OF RISK,
REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009) (recounting the rise and eventual fall of rational
and efficient market theories and the Chicago school’s embrace).
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same or lower prices. In reality, whites often refused to associate with blacks at any
cost. Besides, even if discrimination did suddenly disappear, the broken markets of
the ghetto would not. Discrimination had created macro market forces that were
now operating on their own. Yet neoliberal dogma and market fundamentalism
demanded adhesion to market theory, which meant an aversion to any and all
“government intervention” aimed at black poverty.
Barry Goldwater’s failed presidential run in 1964 was the watershed moment
for libertarian market principles on the national political stage and created a
movement that only grew stronger over time.195 Goldwater demanded smaller
government involvement and spending in all spheres. Without spewing the racial
animus of the George Wallace wing of his party, he opposed civil rights laws,
integration, and any government program meant to address poverty—all in the
name of free market capitalism. There is no reason to doubt that Goldwater was a
true believer in market fundamentalism. However, Goldwater won back the South
for the Republican Party based on his opposition to integration and civil rights. He
used the principles of libertarianism as a weapon against racial equality and did so
to court the votes of the white supremacist wing of the party.196
Since any redress for past economic exclusion required heavy federal
government action, an immediate libertarian backlash began to delegitimize all
government action. Conservatives began to demand a bill of rights that guaranteed
the right to free use of property, including the right to segregated neighborhoods.
The movement could hardly be seen as anything but a direct response to the
economic demands of the black movement and the government anti-poverty
program.197 Nixon was not a libertarian—he expanded the federal bureaucracy and
created more government agencies than any modern president—but he still
opposed government interference of any kind when it came to integration or
anti-poverty measures. Republican strategist Lee Atwater gave away the playbook
in a 1981 interview:
You start out in 1954 saying nig***, nig***, nig***. By 1968, you can’t say
nig***—that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing,
states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re
195. See generally E.J. DIONNE JR., WHY THE RIGHT WENT WRONG: CONSERVATISM—FROM
GOLDWATER TO THE TEA PARTY AND BEYOND (2016) (making the case that the modern Republican
party is essentially the party of Goldwater).
196. See LOPEZ, supra note 184, at 21, 17–22 (“Goldwater’s conservatism operated in the South
less like a genuine political ideology and more like Wallace’s soft porn racism: as a set of codes that
voters readily understood as defending white supremacy. Goldwater didn’t win the South as a smallgovernment libertarian, but as a racist.”).
197. See JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES
BEHIND THE RADICAL RIGHT 94–111, 167–96 (2016) (discussing how the John Birch society was an
example of the early alliance between segregationists like Wallace with libertarianism. Another link was
John Olin, who began to funnel money toward libertarian organizations including his own Olin
foundation and the Federalist Society after witnessing the 1969 takeover of the Cornell campus by a
black power group during alumni weekend. Olin also funded Charles Murray’s research, which
produced several tracts on racial inferiority, including the Bell Curve.).
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talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are
totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt more
than whites.198
The theory of economic dogma, which James Kwak has called “Economism,”
began to be adhered to like a religious dogma and used to fight each and every
government intervention to remedy past sins.199 Economism even provided a new
justification for stark wealth inequality and exploitation. Inequality along racial lines
has been a constant on the American scene, but different eras have justified it with
different myths. Christianity was corrupted to hold that white men had a divine
right—even duty—to subjugate and enslave blacks. When religious theory fell out
of favor, social Darwinism and skull measurements held that blacks were an inferior
species who had lost the evolutionary race and thus their subjugation was nature’s
will. Now, economic theory held that “the free market” decreed that blacks hold
the bottom rung because, for example, it was the laws of supply and demand that
caused blacks to pay more for credit and the market that determined how much
their labor was worth and that integration was anti-market. Any effort to change
these markets were delegitimized and labeled as harmful government interference
with what President Regan called “the magic of the marketplace.”200 And just as
“God’s will” was difficult to challenge in the 1800s, so too was free market
economic theory in the 1960s lest one be labeled a heretic or a communist.
For the ascendant libertarians that were taking hold of American politics, the
only acceptable remedy for a history of exclusion was black capitalism. But what
these white policymakers surely meant by black capitalism was capitalism only for
blacks. Government intervention in markets had been the norm as were
government-imposed Jim Crow laws. Capitalism had not created the ghetto and
black poverty—racist laws and state intervention in the markets had created both.
There had never been free market capitalism for blacks. After years of exclusion,
Jim Crow, segregation, and the deviant markets these state interventions had
created, the Nixon administration was actually proposing that maintaining that
segregated market was the remedy—that somehow by attaching the word “black”
to “capitalism” would remedy past wrongs.
Nixon unveiled his plan in a series of campaign ads and speeches. One ad,
entitled “The Wrong Road,” showcased images of mostly brown and black povertystricken faces and a sign saying “Government Checks Cashed Here.”201 In addition
to this imagery, Nixon’s voice explained, “For the past five years we’ve been
198. See The Nation, Lee Atwater’s Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern Strategy, YOUTUBE
(Nov. 13, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X_8E3ENrKrQ [ https://perma.cc/4W62PZNK ].
199. JAMES KWAK, ECONOMISM: BAD ECONOMICS AND THE RISE OF INEQUALITY 7 (2017).
200. President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation on United States-Soviet Relations
(Sept. 29, 2014).
201. Presidential Campaign Commercials 1968, C-SPAN ( Jan. 1, 1968, 1:22 PM), https://
www.c-span.org/video/?153104-1/presidential-campaign-commercials-1968 [ https://perma.cc/
P5SV-4EF3 ].
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deluged by programs for the unemployed—programs for the cities—programs for
the poor. And we have reaped from these programs an ugly harvest of frustration,
violence and failure across the land.”202 The rhetoric of this ad was a subtle
subversion of the Kerner commission language, which called violence the harvest
of racism. Now, according to Nixon, violence was a direct result of government
aid—never mind that the violence preceded the poverty programs. At the end of
the ad, as the music became more upbeat, and the camera panned across images of
construction sites, a factory line, and a shipyard, Nixon pronounced, “We should
enlist private enterprise to solve the problems of America.”203 In a subsequent ad
called “Black Capitalism,” Nixon promised to save the ghetto with a “hand-up,” not
a “handout.”204 More specifically, he promised “to get private enterprise into the
ghetto and the ghetto into private enterprise.”205 He said that integration of the
races must come, “but in order for it to come on sound and equal basis the black
community has to build from within.”206 Presumably, he meant that blacks would
have to work toward integration themselves as though segregation had been an act
of nature, not a system imposed and enforced by racism and the government.207
Nixon believed that the government’s “overpromising and under-producing”
had caused the rioting and vowed “not [to] overpromise.”208 He was clear that the
“federal government [did] not have the funds . . . to appropriate billions of dollars
for our cities.”209 He believed that it was time to see what “private enterprise and
individuals” could do to “provide hope” and “reconciliation.”210 In a speech called
Human Dignity, he explained that the country needed to “go beyond civil rights.”211
Actually, in the initial draft of the speech in Nixon’s presidential files, the speech
said, “Forget civil rights.”212 Nixon highlighted the word “forget” and replaced it
with “go beyond.”213 The message was the same. He said that “Civil Rights is no
longer an issue” and that Jim Crow and segregation were over. 214 To him, it was
time to focus on self-determination and “dignity.” But, by dignity, Nixon was
communicating that blacks needed to learn to survive on their own and that asking
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. BARADARAN, supra note 139.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Both commercials in Nixon archives: https://ws.onehub.com/folders/nwsx31jv (start at
55:43).
208.
209. Transcript Q&A with Students at the University of Oregon, File 8, ARRA 24, 1968.
(transcript) (on file with the Richard Nixon Presidential Library).
210. Id.
211. David Lindsey Snead, Eisenhower and the Gaither Report: The Influence of a Committee
of Experts on National Security Policy in the Late 1950s (1997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Virginia).
212. President Richard Nixon, Human Dignity (Apr. 6, 1968) (draft speech) (on file with
author).
213. Id.
214. Id.
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the government for help was depriving them of their dignity. “At long last, the
Negro has his bill of rights—but he cannot pay the bill.”215
In a radio program in April of 1968, Nixon promised “more black ownership,
black pride, black jobs, black opportunity, and yes, black power, in the best, the
constructive sense of that often misapplied term.”216 Nixon essentially borrowed
his rhetoric from Malcolm X who had stated that the “black man should be focusing
his every effort toward building his own business, and decent homes for himself”
although Nixon left out the part where Malcolm had said, “[S]how me a capitalist,
I’ll show you a bloodsucker.”217 He also ignored the part of the black power
platform that demands land, reparations, and political sovereignty. Notably, Nixon
enthusiastically embraced voluntary segregation, self-reliance, and private
enterprise. Nixon and his advisors intended black capitalism to completely replace
Johnson’s anti-poverty programs. According to a Nixon biographer, he “presented
black capitalism as both a panacea and a fait accompli.”218 Nixon’s speechwriter,
Raymond K. Price, explained that the path forward involved replacing “the Negro
habit of dependence” with “one of independence” and “personal responsibility.”
According to Nixon, the history of the black community was a perpetual
state of dependency on government largesse. This perspective was inconceivably
shortsighted. In reality, the black community had been trying to “help themselves”
for generations, but they were repeatedly blocked by racist laws and thwarted by
racist policy. The meager “handouts” had only begun a few years prior, and most
notably, the ghetto was the only pocket in the entire American landscape that had
never received government subsidies. In fact, the complete and utter lack of any
“handouts” had created the ghetto in the first place; it had only ever had an
economic system of unchecked and unmitigated capitalism. Yet with the eruption
of violence, policymakers proposed a cure to end the ghetto’s ailments: blacks must
learn how to be capitalists.
Black capitalism was a hit with the media and the voters and won Nixon the
Republican primary and the White House. It all sounded great to the press. The
Wall Street Journal and Time magazine embraced Nixon’s black capitalism rhetoric
by calling it “thoughtful” and “promising.”219 Even the Democrat-leaning New
York Times, which usually showed the same disdain for the president that the

215. Id.
216. Nixon Urges “Black Ownership” to Help Solve Racial Problems, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 1968),
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=9C05E5D91E39E134BC4E51DFB2668383679
EDE [ https://perma.cc/9B5J-TK5R ].
217. EARL OFARI, THE MYTH OF BLACK CAPITALISM 3 (1970).
218. DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI, NIXON’S CIVIL RIGHTS: POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND POLICY 133
(2002).
219. Monroe W. Karmin, Best Laid Plans…, WALL STREET J., Dec. 24, 1970, at 1. (reporting
that much of the appeal of Nixon’s Voluntary Action program “rested in his view that it could
serve as a substitute for costly Federal aid programs. Black Capitalism held the same allure.”);
Black Capitalism: A Disappointing Start, TIME (Aug. 15, 1969), http://content.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,901274,00.html [ https://perma.cc/P5CE-BJ9J ].
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president showed for it, endorsed black capitalism. The paper’s associate editor,
Tom Wicker, wrote, “Richard Nixon’s radio speech on the need for the
development of Black Capitalism and ownership in the ghetto could prove to be
more constructive than anything yet said by other Presidential candidates on the
crisis of the cities.” 220
Republicans embraced black capitalism wholeheartedly. Nelson Rockefeller’s
strategist called black capitalism “a stroke of political genius,” and Rockefeller
himself supported the idea.221 Conservative New York Senator James L. Buckley
praised the “spirit” of “militant black leaders who have been preaching black
initiative, black capitalism, and yes, black power.”222 Buckley aligned black
capitalism with a libertarian small government philosophy, and he proposed that the
program need not go to the entire black populace because “scattered success can
give universal hope.”223 This was the key objective: the government did not need to
underwrite black businesses, just the community’s hope in black businesses. Nixon’s
top aide, John Ehlrichman, explained that “[w]ith a relatively small budget impact,
this is one program which can put the Administration in good light with Blacks
without carrying a severe negative impact on the majority community, as is often
the case with civil rights issues.”224 The budget certainly was small as was the impact.
Nixon and his administration placed more emphasis on black capitalism in
advertising and press response than in policymaking.225
In 1969, President Nixon signed Executive Order 11458 establishing the
Office of Minority Business Enterprise (OMBE) within the Department of
Commerce. The OMBE was not allocated any direct funds; instead, it was instructed
to seek private business contributions and help from other federal agencies. In real
political terms, this lack of direct funding meant that the “OMBE was given
responsibility for ‘advising,’ ‘encouraging,’ ‘mobilizing,’ ‘evaluating,’ ‘collecting’
information, and ‘coordinating’ activities,” but beyond this vague mission, it did not
have a mandate or a budget with which to make unilateral decisions or to make any
loans or grants.226 Any money on the OMBE received came from the Office of
Economic Opportunity’s (OEO) anti-poverty budget.227 Nonetheless, the House

220. Tom Wicker, In the Nation: A Coalition for What?, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 1968), http://
queary.nytimes.com/mem/archive/pdf?res=9F01E7DE1330EE3BBC4152DFB3668383679EDE.
221.
GERALD S. STROBER ET AL., NIXON: AN ORAL HISTORY OF HIS PRESIDENCY 110
(1994); Dean J. Kotlowski, Black Power Nixon Style: The Nixon Administration and Minority Business
Enterprise, 72 BUS. HIST. REV. 409, 418 (1998).
222. William F. Buckley Jr., On Black Capitalism, NAT’L REV., Mar. 25, 1969.
223. Id.
224. Kotlowski, supra note 218, at 135–36.
225. ARTHUR I. BLAUSTEIN & GEOFFREY FAUX, THE STAR-SPANGLED HUSTLE 128 (1972).
(“The Black Capitalism program was more alive in the typewriters of the press than in the minds of the
President and his chief aides.”).
226. Id. at 131.
227. Id. at 132; WEEMS, supra note 153; Kotlowski, supra note 221, at 138.
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Select Committee on Small Business immediately opposed the agency, calling it
“discrimination in reverse.”228
By 1970, a recession had hit the country. The unemployment statistics were so
bad by 1971 that the Nixon administration decided to stop reporting them. The new
aspiring entrepreneurs in the ghetto suffered most acutely as inflation soared, and
banks closed the credit pipeline. A black accounting firm in New York summarized
the situation by explaining that “the people least likely to succeed in business were
trying to make it at a time when seasoned businessmen were having trouble.”229
The least controversial and most durable black capitalism program was the
1970 Minority Bank Deposit Program (MBDP). Ever since Washington
policymakers had linked ghetto rioting with credit exploitation, multiple programs
had been proposed to fix credit inequalities. These proposed programs involved
creating new banking institutions, providing loan guarantees, capital infusions, or
Marshall Plans for the ghetto. The Nixon administration rejected all of these
proposals, choosing to ask government agencies to deposit their accounts in black
banks instead. In 1968, a black banker remarked that these agency deposits would
not provide a good basis for financing banks in the ghetto due to their instability.230
Even so, the agency deposits occurred. The initial goal was to encourage federal
agencies to deposit $100 million of their accounts in black banks, but the yield was
a mere $35 million by 1971.231
The first agency to volunteer, the Post Office, announced that it would
deposit $75 million in black banks. 232 In reality, it only deposited $150,000.233 Even
so, they kept this small sum rotating through the different banks. “One businessman
quipped about the deposit, ‘It was like me saying I’ll lend you $365,000 for the next
year and then lending you a dollar every morning and taking it back every night.’”234
These deposits were the same type that had been crippling the black banks for years
and thus were not the deposits that the black banks desperately needed. The
president of Unity Bank in Roxbury complained that the Post Office even refused
to bring the money to the bank: “They expected us to hire a security service to
collect deposits that we couldn’t even make any money on.”235 After complaints
about the added cost burden of postal deposits, the program promised the banks
that it would send more valuable deposits from other agencies, which they did.

228. Kotlowski, supra note 221, at 137.
229. Black Capitalism: The Crowning Blow, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 1971.
230. GERALD S. STROBER ET AL., NIXON: AN ORAL HISTORY OF HIS PRESIDENCY
110 (1994).
231. BARADARAN, supra note 139, at 185.
232. Id.; see also id. at 183–209 (noting that the post office saving bank had been phased out in
1966 and the deposits were still in flux until they were formally discontinued in 1971, so the postal
deposits were small accounts from the low-income and small cash amounts collected from the post
office’s money order sales).
233. BARADARAN, supra note 139, at 183-209.
234. Id.
235. BLAUSTEIN & FAUX, supra note 225, at 203–05.
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However, all of the government deposits ended up costing banks more than they
were worth.
An expert of political détente, Nixon used black capitalism to let out just
enough steam from the pent-up pressure cooker of rage in the poverty-stricken
ghetto to squelch the brewing revolution.236 Ultimately, black capitalism was weak
and entirely unresponsive to the needs of the black community. But it was vague
enough to offer just enough hope to cool the boiling anger just as it was about to
spill over. With black capitalism alone, Nixon weakened the black radicals’ demand
for black power, abandoned Johnson’s anti-poverty programs, maintained his
opposition to integration, and even won the support of many black leaders.
The promise of black capitalism was so politically appealing that every
presidential administration since that of Nixon has adopted it in one form or
another, be it “community capitalism,” “enterprise zones,” or “minority enterprise.”
President Reagan called black business and black banking the “key to black
economic progress” and promised that black banks could have a “beneficial
multiplier effect” in black ghettos.237 President Clinton created robust legislation to
promote “community empowerment” through banking—an infrastructure that
Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama bolstered and maintained.238 Even
the precedent-breaking President Trump has followed suit. In his “New Deal with
Black America,” Trump promised tax breaks for inner-city investments and credit
support for black businesses.239 Amidst a widening racial wealth gap, the promotion
of black banking and microenterprise has been a consistent policy Band-Aid. These
“solutions” have turned out to be a decoy response to the fundamental challenge
of overcoming America’s legacy of slavery and institutional racism. Instead of
providing meaningful financial inclusion, key policymakers continue to believe that
bankers will save the ghetto. The next section will describe the two most pivotal
legislative acts aimed to foster financial inclusion and to reverse the effects of
redlining and describe how each was rooted in Nixon’s black capitalism
infrastructure and the neoliberal understanding of market supremacy. As a result of
the flawed premise of both of these acts, they have been ineffective yet championed
across partisan lines.

236. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON VOL. 2: THE TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN 1962-1972. At
125–26 (1989); Robert E. Weems & Lewis A. Randolph, The National Response to Richard M. Nixon’s
Black Capitalism Initiative: The Success of Domestic Detente, 32 J. BLACK STUD. 66 (2001).
237.
238.
239.
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TWO POLICIES FOR TWO AMERICAS: THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
AND THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ACT
President Reagan enthusiastically supported black business even while cutting
poverty aid. Speaking to the NAACP in 1981, he praised black business leaders and
said that minority business development “is a key to black economic progress.
Black-owned businesses are especially important in neighborhood economies where
the dollars, as I said, spent have a beneficial multiplier effect.”240 President Reagan
linked his belief in market deregulation with civil rights, declaring “[a] free economy
helps defeat discrimination by fostering opportunity for all.”241 President Reagan
promised that lower taxes and fewer regulations would revitalize the area and attract
more small businesses. He referred to inner city ghettos as “enterprise zones.” In
fact, the 1984 GOP platform called on Congress to pass legislation to help
“enterprise zones, to draw a green line of prosperity around the red-lined areas of
our cities and to help create jobs and entrepreneurial opportunities.”242 The civil
rights plank in the 1988 GOP platform promised to “increase, strengthen, and
reinvigorate minority business development efforts to afford socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals the opportunity for full participation in our
free enterprise system.”243 Reagan did not offer any specific plans to create jobs or
opportunities in the ghetto besides tax cuts. Based on Milton Friedman’s free
market theories, the presumption was that unrestrained capitalism would eradicate
racial inequality.
In a 1982 speech, Reagan declared that for the rest of his administration, the
first week of October would be “Minority Enterprise Development Week.”244 In
1983, he issued an executive order requiring federal agencies to provide annual goals
on increasing procurements from minority businesses.245 Even though the theory
and infrastructure of black capitalism continued unabated for decades, its original
aim as a remedy to the ghetto economy and a response to the black power
movement changed over time. For example, both President Carter and President

240. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People in Denver, Colorado ( June 29, 1982); see also BARADARAN,
supra note 139, 69–100 (discussing black banking and the money multiplier effect).
241. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM OF 1988: AN
AMERICAN VISION: FOR OUR CHILDREN AND OUR FUTURE (Aug. 16. 1988), available at https://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1988 [ https://perma.cc/F5QYRDVT ].
242. Id. (noting that Carter’s Secretary of State, Brian Kemp, used the phrase “enterprise zones”
to refer to inner city ghettos that would ostensibly spur commerce within the walls of the ghetto).
243. Id.
244. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN AMERICAN BUSINESS 536 ( Jesse Carney Smith ed., 2006)
(“Each year the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Minority Business Development Agency and the
U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Office of Government Contracting and Business
Development collaborate to hold regional conferences and activities. The recognition also aims to
promote the growth of minority-owned businesses as well as encourage equal access to federal
contracts, capital, management, and technical assistance.”); see also WEEMS, supra note 153, at 219.
245. WEEMS, supra note 153.
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Reagan passed initiatives to include women in most of the SBA and MDBA grant
programs.246 President Reagan’s Women’s Business Ownership Act of 1988
mandated that the SBA provide additional aid to female-owned enterprise.247
Originally, black capitalism initiatives were designed to provide a politically
neutralizing response to one of the biggest racial uprisings in history. Now,
however, these programs provide business support for all minority groups,
including women. The theory of black enterprise ceased to be discussed as an antipoverty measure and certainly not as a black power initiative. Instead, it transformed
into positive role models for minority communities and “diversifying” white-male
dominated fields.
Along the way, the legislature incorporated features of the black capitalism
program into law. For example, in 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) as a response to the savings
and loan crisis. The act primarily focused on regulating the failed thrift sector, but
it also included a provision about minority banks. Section 308 of FIRREA, entitled
Preserving Minority Ownership of Minority Financial Institutions, contained the first
legislative decree concerning minority banks.248 Section 308 did not authorize any
financial help to black banks, but rather it instructed the FDIC, the Treasury, and
the now defunct Office of Thrift Supervision to pay attention to the sector.249 More
specifically, Section 308 instructed the agencies to work toward preserving “the
present number” and the “character” of minority deposit institutions.250 For
example, in the event a minority institution was threatened by failure, the law
instructed bank regulators to ensure that the bank’s minority nature was preserved
by, if possible, merging it with another minority bank in the region. The act also
mandated that federal regulators provide “training, technical assistance and
education programs” to all minority banks as well as to work towards promoting
and encouraging new minority deposit insurance.251
The act constituted the first time that Congress provided a legal definition for
minority banks. The definition itself revealed just how muddled the issue of black
banking had become and how far the concept of black capitalism had migrated from
its initial aim. During the era of Jim Crow and segregation, a legal definition for a
black bank was unnecessary—a black bank served black customers in a black

246. The Administration of Jimmy Carter, 1 PUB. PAPERS 74 (1980).
247. Women’s Business Ownership Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-533 (1988) (current version
at 41 U.S.C. § 1713).
248. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
12 U.S.C. § 308 (2013).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See BARADARAN, supra note 139, at 340 n.53 (“Specifically, it requires banking regulators
to (1) preserve the number of minority depository institutions; (2) preserve the minority character in
cases of merger or acquisition; (3) provide technical assistance to prevent insolvency of institutions not
now insolvent; (4) promote and encourage the creation of new minority deposit institutions; and (5)
provide training, technical assistance, and education programs. FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. 308 (2013).”).
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community. When Nixon issued Executive Order 11458 establishing the OMBE
and the black capitalism framework, he did not include a legal definition.252
Everyone knew that he was talking about establishing black-owned institutions in
the ghetto.253 However, after the initial crisis had passed, the Nixon administration
began speaking more vaguely about “minority business enterprise.” Some observers
believed this was due to Nixon’s desire to court the Mexican vote. Notably, his only
minority appointment to his administration was conservative Mexican Hilary
Sandoval to head the SBA.254
With the revision of the black capitalism program in Executive Order 11625,
Nixon defined “minority business enterprise” for the first time in 1971 as a business
that was “owned or controlled by one or more socially or economically
disadvantaged persons. Such disadvantage may arise from cultural, racial, chronic
economic circumstances or background or other similar cause. Such persons
include, but are not limited to, Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Spanish-speaking
Americans, American Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.”255 Unsurprisingly, this vague
and convoluted definition offers little clarity. Such a definition was to be expected
from a program that began as an ill-defined political response to an acute national
crisis. Other than being ambiguous, the definition also revealed the perplexity and
double-speak of the black capitalism federal policy framework. Section 308(b)
defined a minority institution as a bank that is 51% owned by “one or more socially
and economically disadvantaged individuals.”256 For public banks, it required a
majority of stockholders to be “socially and economically disadvantaged.”257 The
statute did not go on to define what this meant or how it should be interpreted. To
further the confusion, when the act defined minority “cooperatives” or “mutually
owned minority banks” in the very next sentence of the section, it changed the
definition of a minority bank to one where a “majority of the Board of Directors,
account holders, and the community which [the bank] services is predominantly
minority.”258 The act then defined “minority” as “any black American, Native
American, Hispanic American, or Asian American.”259 The act underscores the
conflicting agendas that bred black capitalism by defining a minority institution
simultaneously as one that serves economically disadvantaged individuals and one
that serves a defined group of minorities.

252.
253.

Exec. Order No. 11,458, 34 Fed. Reg. 4937 (Mar. 5, 1969).
EUGENE BOYD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MINORITY BUSINESS
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY: AN OVERVIEW OF ITS HISTORY AND CURRENT ISSUES 1–2 (2017).
254. JONATHAN J. BEAN, BIG GOVERNMENT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 71 (2001).
255. Exec Order No. 11,625, 3 C.F.R. 616 (1971), reprinted in 15 U.S.C.A. § 631 (West 1976).
256. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 308(1)(A)(B) (2013).
257. Id. ((1)(A) holds that if a bank is privately owned, the 51 percent ownership applies to
individuals and (1)(B) holds that it applies to 51 percent majority stock ownership).
258. Id. § 308(b)(1)(C).
259. Id. § 308(b)(2).
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Faced with conflicting definitions in the statute, the regulators simply
created their own definition in order to enforce Congress’s mandate. For example,
the FDIC determined that a minority deposit institution was one that is majority
owned by U.S. citizens who are “Black American, Asian American, Hispanic
American, or Native American.”260 The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) did
the same.261
President Clinton brought some much-needed clarity to black capitalism
policy as he revitalized the programs. He talked about black banks the way that
Nixon initially had, as a means of confronting black ghetto poverty, but he did so
without mentioning race. President Clinton, calling himself a “New Democrat,”
proposed a “third way” platform between Republicans and Democrats. Clinton
slashed welfare benefits, which he believed caused a cycle of dependence.262 Clinton
expanded the Earned Income Tax Credit, Head Start, and increased minimum wage,
which he said properly “emphasize[d] work and independence.”263 However,
Clinton tried to steer the party away from Johnson’s war against poverty. In fact,
both Clinton’s and Carter’s rhetoric and policies on racial equality followed
President Nixon’s lead as opposed to their Democratic predecessors.
Clinton embedded his urban poverty programs firmly in neoliberal market
ideology. The country’s racial ghettos, whose walls still remained intact, came to be
referred to as enterprise zones, emerging markets, and niche industries. These were
places that could certainly yield a profit if creative entrepreneurs looked hard
enough. Clinton passed a series of laws that provided tax inducements to encourage
private firms to invest in impoverished communities.264 Essentially, Clinton’s
policies provided an incentive-based boost to Nixon’s black capitalism framework.
Nixon had tried—with minimal effort and minimal success—to induce large whiteowned firms to voluntarily contribute to black businesses. Even the firms
themselves had viewed their involvement as charitable and entirely voluntary. In
contrast, Clinton’s program did not appeal to philanthropic aims at all. Instead, he
promised profits. Clinton’s Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) secretary, Andrew Cuomo, told reporters, it “is not about charity. It’s about

260. FDIC, POLICY STATEMENT REGARDING MINORITY DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
(2002),
261. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-6, MINORITY BANKS: REGULATORS
NEED TO BETTER ASSESS EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPPORT EFFORTS (2006).
262. KATHRYN J. EDIN & H. LUKE SHAEFER, $2.00 A DAY: LIVING ON ALMOST NOTHING
IN AMERICA 17 (2015).
263. The Text of President Clinton’s Announcement on Welfare Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
1996.
264. Background on The Clinton-Gore Administration’s Community Development Record,
THE WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 4, 1999), https://clintonwhitehouse3.archives.gov/WH/New/
New_Markets_Nov/factsheets/comdevl.html [ https://perma.cc/R593-SLU3 ] (noting that the
initiatives included Empowerment Zones, Enterprise Communities initiative, Expansions of the LowIncome Housing Tax Credit, and the Community Development Financial Institution Fund).
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investment.”265 Academics and progressive reformers agreed that ghetto poverty
was a result of misaligned market incentives and could only be addressed through
private enterprise. For example, influential Harvard professor Michael Porter wrote
that instead of aid or social investments, the only way to build the economy of the
ghetto was “through private, for-profit initiatives and investment based on
economic self-interest and genuine advantage . . . . The cornerstone of such a model
is to identify and exploit the competitive advantages of inner cities that will translate
into truly profitable businesses.”266 Ghettos were labeled “emerging markets” and
“untapped markets,” which contained hidden opportunities that creative profitoriented private enterprises could exploit. This rhetoric emphasized a win-win of
profits for the entrepreneurs and poverty alleviation for the ghetto. Policymakers
sought to fix all of the ghetto’s problems with entrepreneurs, instead of working to
break down the walls of segregation and the poverty trap.
Because the Supreme Court found remedying past wrongs to be
unconstitutional, an era of colorblindness ensued.267 As a result, these programs
directed towards the country’s ghettos had to be race neutral. Black capitalism
became “community capitalism.” A 1997 conference, entitled the American
Assembly, brought together business and community leaders and academics to
discuss poverty and community development. The final conference report defined
community capitalism as a “for-profit, business-driven expansion of investment,
job creation, and economic opportunities in distressed communities, with
government and the community sectors playing key supportive roles.”268 Vice
President Al Gore endorsed the report, stating, “The greatest untapped markets in
the world are right here at home, in our distressed communities.”269
Just like Nixon’s black capitalism, Clinton’s “community capitalism” was a
bipartisan winner. Missouri Republican Representative James Talent praised the bill

265. JULIA S. RUBIN & GREGORY M. STANKEWICZ, EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES ON TARGETED POPULATIONS: THE CASE OF
THE NEW MARKETS INITIATIVES OF 2000 (2003).
266. Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, 73 HARV. BUS. REV. 55, 55–
71 (1995) (“We must stop trying to cure the inner city’s problems by perpetually increasing social
investment and hoping for economic activity to follow. Instead, an economic model must begin with
the premise that inner city businesses should be profitable and positioned to compete on a regional,
national, and even international scale.”).
267. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505–06 (1989) (In City of
Richmond v. Croson, the Supreme Court agreed and ended the contract set-aside program. The Court
rejected Richmond’s claim that “past societal discrimination” could justify a racial preference. Justice
O’Connor even summoned Dr. King’s rhetoric in order to reject any program that would favor blacks
over whites, stating that “the dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to
personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based
on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.”)
268. NINETY-FIRST AM. ASSEMBLY, COMMUNITY CAPITALISM: REDISCOVERING THE
MARKETS OF AMERICA’S URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 3 (Columbia Univ. Press ed., 1997).
269. BARADARAN, supra note 139, at 341 n.65; NINETY-FIRST AM. ASSEMBLY, supra note 268
(“According to Clinton official Gene Sperling, the legislation was meant to create “incentives that
would encourage the private sector to find profits and create opportunities.”).
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as “not only the most comprehensive antipoverty package coming out of the federal
government . . . in a generation, but it also . . . has assimilated the lessons that
people on both sides of the aisle have learned over the last generations.”270 Jesse
Jackson enthusiastically joined Clinton’s community enterprise agenda with his 1998
“Close the Gaps. Leave No American Behind” campaign. Jackson proposed that
the president create “vehicles to move capital” into disadvantaged areas. 271
Clinton’s “community capitalism” program as applied to banks was the Riegle
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, commonly
known as the Community Development Banking Act (CDBA).272 The Act provided
tax incentives for banks, or Community Development Financial Institutions
(CDFIs), that served disadvantaged areas. 273 According to Clinton, a South Side
Chicago bank that was putting the theory of community capitalism into practice
inspired the promulgation of the bill. This bank, called Shorebank, was the country’s
most famous “black bank,” even though it was not black owned.274
Shorebank’s motto—”Let’s Change the World”—was not an empty
marketing pitch. As the exemplar of community capitalism, Shorebank promoted a
“triple bottom line: profitability, community development impact, and an
environmental return.”275 Shorebank’s primary aim centered on fighting urban
decline. At its peak, it had $4.1 billion invested in inner-city Chicago.276 The bank’s
ambitious mission drew many admirers, including Grameen Bank founder
Muhammad Yunus, who visited the bank before launching microcredit in
Bangladesh and receiving a Nobel Peace Prize for his innovative approach to
poverty.277
The bank certainly had its struggles, particularly against the same profitability
trap that had ensnared black banks for nearly a century. For the first decade, the
bank lost money because its loans were risky, deposits were small, and operation
costs were high.278 In short, Shorebank’s founders came to the same realization that
many had reached before them—that operating a profitable bank in a poor and

270. Tammy Draut et al., Crossing Divides: New Common Ground on Poverty and Economy Security,
DEMOS, Sept. 1, 2002, at 3.
271. BARADARAN, supra note 139, at 149.
272. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
273. James E. Post & Fiona S. Wilson, Too Good to Fail, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (2011).
274. Loic J.D. Wacquant & William J. Wilson, Poverty, Joblessness, and the Social
Transformation of the Inner City, in WELFARE POLICY FOR THE 1990S 70, 92 (Phoebe H. Cottingham &
David T. Ellwood eds., 1989); David Moberg, The Left Bank, CHI. READER (May 26, 1994), https://
www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/the-left-bank/Content?oid=884620 [ https://perma.cc/5AFGJNSV ].
275. Robert A. Solomon, The Fall (and Rise?) of Community Banking: The Continued Importance
of Local Institutions, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 945, 955 (2012).
276. Post & Wilson, supra note 273, at 66.
277. Katharine Esty, Lessons from Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank: Leading Long-term
Organizational Change Successfully, 43 OD PRACTITIONER 24 (2011).
278. Post & Wilson, supra note 273.
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segregated ghetto is a challenge. However, Shorebank enjoyed more outside
“socially inclined” capital investment than most black-owned banks. For example,
Shorebank had private funders who “invested with the understanding that the
primary purpose of their investment is to do development and not maximize return
on capital.”279 As Governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton visited the bank in 1985 and
called it “the most important bank in America.” 280 In promoting the Shorebank
model, Clinton outlined his early vision for community empowerment:
You have to go into these areas with strategies that enable people to take
control of their own destiny . . . . We need to create a small-business
entrepreneurial economy in every underclass urban area and rural area in
the country through the use of banks like the South Shore Bank, which
played a major role in revitalizing the South Side of Chicago. To most
people, “empowerment” sounds like a buzzword, but the truth is that
America can’t get very far with a dependent or helpless population. Trying
to create an entrepreneurial economy around a different sort of banking
system.281
To President Clinton, a “different sort of banking system” meant one in which
a community’s banks were “owned and operated by the people who live there.”282
This philosophy was not new. In fact, it had been the theory of black capitalism all
along—the premise being that control of banking within a community would lead
to “empowerment” and economic equality. But, unlike previous administrations,
Clinton chose to support his vision for community capitalism with actions, such as
significant tax credits, as opposed to mere rhetoric.
While on the campaign trail in 1992, Clinton promised to establish one
hundred banks modeled after Shorebank.283 This promise manifested itself in the
CDBA, which promised to “promote economic revitalization and community
development through investment in and assistance to community development
financial institutions.”284 As required by the Supreme Court, the law was raceneutral, but its clear mission was to propagate more banks like Shorebank in the
ghetto. These banks, called CDFIs, were defined as institutions that (1) had “a
primary mission of promoting community development”; (2) “[served] an

279.
280.

BARADARAN, supra note 139, at 164.
RICHARD DOUTHWAITE, SHORT CIRCUIT: STRENGTHENING LOCAL ECONOMIES FOR
SECURITY IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD 153 (1996); see also Sharon Stangenes, South Shore Bank Thrust into
Spotlight, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 15, 1992), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1992-11-159204130554-story.html [ https://perma.cc/B8QB-2DZH ] (discussing Bill Clinton’s advocacy of South
Shore Bank during his 1992 presidential campaign).
281. Jann S. Wenner, Bill Clinton: The Rolling Stone Interview, ROLLING STONE (Sept. 17, 1992),
http://www.jannswenner.com/archives/bill_clinton.aspx [ https://perma.cc/44TZ-AZMJ ].
282. Id.
283. Banking on the Inner City, WASH. POST, July 19, 1993 (“The CDFI Fund of $382 million
proposed by Clinton is] significantly less ambitious than Mr. Clinton’s campaign proposal to use $850
million of federal money to establish 100 community development banks around the country modeled
after Chicago’s successful South Shore Bank.”).
284. 12 U.S.C. § 4701(b) (2006).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395876

Clean Final Edit_Baradaran.docx (Do Not Delete)

148

U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW

5/18/19 8:43 PM

[Vol. 9:X

investment area or targeted population”; and (3) “provide[d] development services
in conjunction with equity investments or loans.”285
This new approach to black banking found proponents across both sides of
the racial and political spectrum. African American Senator Carol Mosely-Braun
remarked that the bill “suggests that the financial institutions can do well and do
good simultaneously . . . that financial institutions can make money by expanding
credit opportunities to underserved communities.”286 Republican Congressman
Tom Ridge commented that “communities without credit are very much like land
without rain, nothing grows.”287 Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy said that “whole
segments of our people in this country are unfairly denied access to credit, [it is our
job] to make certain that financial institutions make credit available to all of those
people who can afford to pay it back.”288 One senator described the present issue
as “not whether community development banks are a good idea . . . but rather how
do we establish them . . . .”289
The central theory behind the CDFIs was that they would discover hidden
profits in the ghetto. Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers envisioned “[a]
successful CDFI [as] perhaps best compared to a niche venture capital firm that
deploys its superior knowledge of an emerging market niche to invest and manage
risk better than other investors.”290 Summers labeled these banks “market scouts”
that would seek out profits in overlooked markets. Yet black banks had long been
attempting to make profits in the ghetto, only to find that the stubborn financial
landscape of the ghetto economy had always stood in the way, as CDFIs would
soon learn. As with black banks, CDFIs have struggled to remain profitable despite
help from the tax code. CDFIs routinely show weaker financial performance across
the board compared with their more conventional peers.291 Remarkably, minority
banks have been essentially shut out of the CDFI fund. Since its inception, only
between 2% and 6% of these funds have been awarded to minority banks.292 The

285. Id. § 4702(5)(A)(i)–(iii).
286. BARADARAN, supra note 139, at 231.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Lawrence H. Summers, U.S. Sec’y of Treasury, Building Emerging Markets in America’s
Inner Cities, Remarks to the National Council for Urban Economic Development (Mar. 2, 1998), http:/
/www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr2262.aspx [ https://perma.cc/Y7Z8-V7TT ].
291. Lehn Benjamin et al., Community Development Financial Institutions: Current Issues and Future
Prospects, 26 J. URB. AFF. 177, 189 (2004); Robert Barba & Joe Adler, Resolution Deal Shows ShoreBank
Was Savvy to the End, AM. BANKER (Aug. 23, 2010), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/
resolution-deal-shows-shorebank-was-savvy-to-the-end [ https://perma.cc/S8Y6-22QN ]; Surviving the
Recession: How Microlenders are Coping with Changing Demand, Risk and Funding, ASPEN INST. (July
1, 2010), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/publications/surviving-recession-microlenders-copingchanging-demand-risk-funding/ [ https://perma.cc/YYA4-BSH4 ].
292. Carolyn M. Brown, Black Banks Shut Out of New Federal Tax Credit Program, BLACK
ENTERPRISE ( July 15, 2015), https://www.blackenterprise.com/minority-banks-shut-out-of-newfederal-tax-credit-program/2/[ https://perma.cc/8HF9-74LQ ](“By our estimates, less than 2% of
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issue stems from the Treasury consistently choosing projects that promised more
profits and had less risk due to its institutional concern of maintaining the fund’s
profitability. This practice has only exacerbated the profit leakage from segregated
minority neighborhoods.293
If the CDFI fund was rooted in the black capitalism model, the CRA was
rooted in the original affirmative action model. Its justification was to remedy a
history of discriminatory redlining, and its mission was to require mainstream banks
to lend a fair portion of their loans to the ghetto. Although redlining had been based
on explicit racial discrimination, policymakers designed the CRA to be color-blind.
Much like affirmative action, the act has been one of the most vilified banking laws,
even as it was criticized by civil rights groups as “toothless” in counteracting the
legacy of past injustices.294
In 1977, Senator Proxmire sponsored the bill when he served as chair of the
Senate Banking Committee. Proxmire had helped pass the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) in 1975, which had forced banks to divulge loan
information based on race. Armed with HMDA data that revealed that banks were
deliberately avoiding making loans in black communities, Proxmire crafted a
legislative remedy. He reasoned that banks had a duty to remedy the problem
because they had created it to begin with. He also believed that banks had an
“obligation to help meet the credit needs” of their local communities.295 He said
that the CRA was based on the “widely shared assumption” that “a public charter
conveys numerous economic benefits and in return it is legitimate for public policy
and regulatory practice to require some public purpose . . . .”296 Proxmire
acknowledged that banks benefited from a healthy amount of public support. As a
result, banks, he believed, should serve public needs, or at least not discriminate
against disadvantaged members of the public. This perspective clashed with the
prevailing neoliberal market philosophy that held that the only obligations banks
had were to their shareholders.
To ensure that banks lent a fair portion of their loans to the ghetto, the bill
required banks to prepare annual reports describing whether they were meeting the
credit needs of low- to moderate-income residents. The bill instructed bank
regulators to rate each bank from “Outstanding” to “Substantial Noncompliance”
based on the quantity of loans they were issuing in low-income areas.297 The bill did

the $450 billion in NMTCs issued over the past [12] years has gone to minority banks,” said Doyle
Mitchell, CEO of Industrial Bank of Washington, D.C. and immediate past Chairman of the NBA).
293. THEODORE L. CROSS, BLACK CAPITALISM: STRATEGY FOR BUSINESS IN THE GHETTO
16 (1969) (According to one observer, the result of the grants has been to “take profits out of the slum
when the real objective should have been to build profits into it.”).
294. Civil Rights Chief Faults CRA as Toothless Legislation, AM. BANKER, May 21, 1992
(“[R]egulators are not enforcing the law aggressively.”).
295. 123 CONG. REC. 1958 (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
296. Id.
297. FDIC, Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) Performance Ratings, FDIC, https://
www5.fdic.gov/crapes/ [ https://perma.cc/TQ5G-8AQV ] ( last visited May 15, 2019 ).
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not force banks to lend or open branches in any particular community, but a
negative CRA rating could be used by a bank regulator to deny a bank’s application
for merger or any other change that required regulatory approval.298
When it was introduced, the bill was openly and strongly condemned by many
bankers and their allies. Republican Senator Phil Graham called the act “an evil like
slavery in the pre-Civil War era.”299 “It’s unbelievable,” fumed one anonymous
Southern banker, “[t]hese people are trying to enforce a change in social policy over
the back of the banking industry.”300 Other opponents raised additional issues with
the bill. They claimed that the bill clashed with efficient market forces and forced
banks to make unprofitable loans. This is evidenced by the fact that if the loans
were profitable, banks would not have needed regulatory nudges to make them.301
At the other end of the spectrum, community groups have expressed concern
that the CRA is more geared towards process than real reform.302 Banks, for
example, receive a rating based on how often they meet with a community group
rather than on the actual results of those meetings. In addition, loans are measured
quantitatively, not qualitatively.
The CRA still finds itself between a group of people who believe it does not
achieve nearly enough and another group that believe it requires too much.303 As a
result, the resemblance to affirmative action in college admission is striking. Much
like affirmative action, there is a perceived feeling that institutions are being forced
to hire lower-quality employees or make lower-quality loans to appease some vague
sense of social morality that is not meritocratic and poses unjustified social burdens
on the bottom line. Detractors of affirmative action argue that schools should only
select students based on academic merit. Similarly, banks should only lend based on
profitability. At the core of their argument, critics claim that affirmative action and
the CRA conflict with a natural meritocracy or an efficient market.

298. RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 385
(5th ed. 2013); Charles W. Calomiris et al., Housing-Finance Intervention and Private Incentives: Helping
Minorities and the Poor, 26 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 634, 654–56 (1994).
299. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, 145 CONG. REC. S4736 (May 5, 1999).
300. Jeffrey Marshall, Lenders Cry Foul Over Fair Lending Prosecutions, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 1, 1994.
301. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic
Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 295 (1993) (claiming that the bill “promotes the concentration of assets
in geographically nondiversified locations, encourages banks to make unprofitable and risky investment
and product-line decisions, and penalizes banks that seek to reduce costs by consolidating services or
closing or relocating branches.”).
302. Preserving and Expanding Minority Banks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Preserving and Expanding
Minority Banks].
303. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 298; Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community
Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 603 (2005) (“CRA’s broad standards and
‘enforcement’ mechanisms . . . have long been derided by both proponents and detractors of CRA.
Community advocates urge stricter rules and harsher consequences of failure. Bankers lament the lack
of clear rules or safe harbors and the intrusive role of the public.”); Calomiris et al., supra note 298, at
673 (stating that “the vagueness of the CRA has led to arbitrary enforcement . . . .”).
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Opponents of affirmative action claim that it harms both the school and the
minority applicant. They reason that the pool of minority applicants performs worse
than white applicants, and when underperforming minority students gain admission,
there is a “mismatch” of capacity.304 According to this widely cited “mismatch
theory,” whites should continue to fill elite universities until blacks catch up
naturally. Banks often follow a similar line of logic by claiming that they should
avoid lending into distressed areas. Banks posit that they are not discriminating, but
rather they are avoiding nonprofitable areas and avoiding riskier loans. Residents of
these areas are more likely to default on a loan because they have fewer resources.
Applying the mismatch theory to banking results in the notion that borrowers
should work to earn bank loans instead of being offered the loans prematurely. This
mismatch can hurt the bank, society, and the borrower.
These arguments only touch on surface-level problems and fail to explore why
black students and black borrowers lag behind whites in the first place. A history
of segregation explains why the ghetto does not yield profitable loans. More
specifically, segregation was enacted through lending discrimination perpetuated by
the very firms now being asked to close the gap. Once the Supreme Court decided
that past injustice could not be rectified through the law, the nation appeared to
erase its memory of the past injustice and allow for these types of shortsighted
arguments in opposition to any program designed to address a historic wrong. The
long debate over the CRA erupted after the financial crisis, with some even
implausibly blaming the CRA for precipitating the financial crisis.
Scholars as well as influential policymakers like the Federal Reserve Chair and
the Treasury Secretary have debunked the theory that the CRA or government
mortgage policy led to the financial crisis.305 In fact, every serious and trustworthy
analysis has concluded that the CRA did not cause the rise in subprime lending.
Such a theory that the CRA led to the financial crisis is implausible. The Act was
passed in 1977, and subprime lending began to rise more than twenty years later.
Also, most of the crisis-causing subprime loans were not made by lenders with any
CRA obligations. In fact, only 6% of subprime loans were even CRA loans.306 Even

304. See generally RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT
(2012).
305. TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 391–92
(2014); see also BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT: A MEMOIR OF A CRISIS AND ITS
AFTERMATH (2015); David Min, Why Wallison Is Wrong About the Genesis of the U.S. Housing Crisis,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ( July 12, 2011, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
economy/reports/2011/07/12/10011/why-wallison-is-wrong-about-the-genesis-of-the-u-s-housingcrisis/ [ https://perma.cc/L7Z2-5CPS ]; Press Release, Robert Menendez, Fed Chairman Bernanke
Confirms to Menendez that Community Reinvestment Act Is Not to Blame for Foreclosure Crisis
(Dec. 2, 2008), https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/fed-chairman-bernankeconfirms-to-menendez-that-community-reinvestment-act-is-not-to-blame-for-foreclosure-crisis
[ https://perma.cc/VLN4-5PNB ].
306. Neil Bhutta & Glenn B. Canner, Did the CRA Cause the Mortgage Meltdown?, COMMUNITY
DIVIDEND (Mar. 1, 2009), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/community-dividend/did-
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so, commentators and politicians continue to blame the one law that was aimed at
increasing minority lending for the financial crisis. A portion of the public likely still
believes that blacks and other minorities do not deserve government benefits and
that they take more than their share. This narrative paints low-income subprime
borrowers as exploiters of taxpayer money and government largesse.307 It is a
convenient fiction that protects banks from appropriate regulation and ignores a
history of injustice.
Those who espouse this fiction simply do not understand the banking
industry. 308 In reality, the banks wanted subprime loans because they were making
unprecedented profits. Subprime lenders appeared in ghettos because they were
able to convince more people to take out subprime loans in the ghettos, not because
the government or community activists wanted the subprime lenders there. In fact,
many activist and consumer groups tried to fight these subprime lenders.309
The rise of subprime mortgage lending occurred because banker and
investor demand increased. Profits drove the narrative. Wall Street banks only
became interested in this market once subprime loans became profitable. In the
years preceding the crisis, the subprime market began overheating due to increased
demand for investments by what economists have labeled a “savings glut.” Foreign
investors flooded U.S. markets with money. This oversupply of cheap cash lowered
U.S. Treasury note yields. As a result, the money flowed into the next safest
investment—asset-backed securities, or home mortgages. To meet the demand, the
financial sector sold, bundled, insured, and created new “structured products,” and
then originated more mortgage loans. This demand created the subprime mortgage
market. The crisis was not created by poor minorities demanding housing loans, but
by Wall Street demanding more loans and then lobbying for government policies
that lowered underwriting standards.310

the-cra-cause-the-mortgage-market-meltdown [ https://perma.cc/PA3Z-UL26 ]; see also Governor
Randall S. Kroszner, Speech at the Confronting Concentrated Poverty Forum (Dec. 3, 2008).
307. ANITA HILL, REIMAGINING EQUALITY: STORIES OF GENDER, RACE, AND FINDING
HOME (2011) (discussing the myth of the “Welfare Queen” and how it is similar to
“subprime borrower” myths).
308. Peter J. Wallison, The True Origins of This Financial Crisis, AM. SPECTATOR, Feb. 6, 2009.
309. Jason Szep, Activists Challenge Lenders in Mortgage Crisis, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2007), https:/
/www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-subprime-activists/activists-challenge-lenders-in-mortgage-crisisidUSN2941217420070331 [https://perma.cc/5K4V-XDBC].
310.
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE
GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS (Mar. 2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TX5H-A4US]; Oiao Yu et al., Global Saving Glut, Monetary Policy, and Housing
Bubble: Further Evidence, BROOKINGS ( July 10, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/globalsaving-glut-monetary-policy-and-housing-bubble-further-evidence/ [ https://perma.cc/2YYKXL52 ].
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THE POOR STILL PAY MORE
The effects of the segregated debt market can still be felt today and have
created two separate and unequal systems of banking and credit: the regulated and
heavily subsidized mainstream banking industry and the unregulated, costly, and
often predatory fringe industry. Having been left out of the former, the black
community has historically occupied the latter. This has come at their great expense.
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler found that on average blacks pay an extra $425
for a loan than white customers.311
Most black neighborhoods are “banking deserts,” or neighborhoods
abandoned by mainstream banks.312 A survey conducted by the FDIC revealed that
53.6% of blacks are either unbanked or under-banked.313 In striking contrast, only
3% of whites do not have a bank account and 15% are underbanked. Those without
bank accounts pay up to 10% of their income or around $2500 per year, just to use
their money.314 That is a meaningful amount of money for low-income Americans,
and it is being sucked up by alternative financial services. This problem has only
worsened since the financial crisis of 2008, when 93% of all bank closings were in
low-income minority neighborhoods.315
When banks leave a neighborhood, high cost payday lenders, title lenders, and
other fringe banks usually fill the void. Once the subprime profits disappeared after
the crisis, banks began avoiding the ghetto again. By 2016, an investigation of
mortgage lending in St. Louis found that banks made fewer loans to borrowers in
black neighborhoods than white ones.316 Moreover, mortgage applicants from
minority zip codes were denied mortgages at significantly higher rates than
applicants in white neighborhoods.317

311. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 134 (2008).
312. Russell D. Kashian et al., Banking the Unbanked: Bank Deserts in the United States 1
(Univ. of Wis., Whitewater, Working Paper No. 90, 2015), http://swfa2015.uno.edu/F_Banking/
paper_90.pdf [ https://perma.cc/LZ2A-TER3 ].
313. SUSAN BURHOUSE ET AL., FDIC, 2013 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS (Oct. 2014), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2013report.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/W7QD-JUPD ].
314.
Serving the Underserved Market, KPMG (2011), http://www.kpmg.com/US/en/Issues
AndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/serving-underserved-market.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
NF2W-AU8Y ]; What Do Consumers Without Bank Accounts Think About Mobile Payments?, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS ( June 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/06/
fsp_what_do_consumers_without_bank_accounts_think_about_mobile_payments.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/P2R6-LAAY ].
315. Frank Bass & Dakin Campbell, Bank Branches Disappear from Poor Neighborhoods Like
Longwood, Bronx, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2013), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0509/bank-branches-disappear-from-poor-neighborhoods-like-longwood-bronx [ https://perma.cc/
PW7Q-JQDT ].
316. Peter Eavis, Race Strongly Influences Mortgage Lending in St. Louis, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES
( July 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/19/business/dealbook/race-strongly-influencesmortgage-lending-in-st-louis-study-finds.html [ https://perma.cc/UD57-M7WC ].
317. Id.
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In banking deserts, blacks rely disproportionately on payday lenders. In fact,
the black community is more than twice as likely as any other race to use payday
loans.318 With such costly credit options, it makes sense that debt collectors extract
as much as five times more judgements against black neighborhoods than white
ones. According to two studies conducted between 2015 and 2016, blacks were
much more likely to be sued by debt collectors than any other racial group. These
studies showed that this was true even when differences in income were accounted
for. Specifically, debt collectors sued one in four black residents in the studied
communities. Most of the other lawsuits were similar: large debt collectors suing for
small amounts.319 The study found that debt collectors were not intentionally
discriminating, but that “white consumers are, in general, better able to resolve
smaller debts.”320 The study confirmed that black communities have less wealth
than white ones and are thus more vulnerable to hardship.321
The black community faces two distinct challenges as a result of the racial
wealth gap. Black families have greater difficulty ascending the economic ladder; it
also means that it is much easier for these families to fall. Because wealth provides
a buffer against life’s hardest edges, those without it find themselves exposed to
devastating financial shocks like bankruptcy, eviction, and apparently lots of
lawsuits. These lawsuits further increase the financial pressure through wage
garnishments, aggressive collection practices, and criminal prosecutions. In turn,
these hardships create a “web of indebtedness,” according to one black resident in
the study.322 Although a wage garnishment can feel like extortion, creditors are
increasingly using actual extortion. Often the original debt collector, such as a
municipality, sells its debts to an underworld of unregulated debt collectors who
threaten debtors with criminal prosecution in order to intimidate them into paying
their debts.323 Despite the fact that these threats are often baseless and illegal, the
unscrupulous bounty hunters continually harass debtors.
Today, much of the legislation and programs remain the same. Banking
agencies are still carrying out their FIRREA legislative mandate to support minority
banks. The MBDP remains, which means that federal agencies and federal grant
recipients are being encouraged to deposit funds into banks owned or controlled by
318. Payday Lending in America: Who Borrows, Where They Borrower, and Why, PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS ( July 2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2012/
pewpaydaylendingreportpdf.pdf [ https://perma.cc/52NC-K2M7 ].
319. Paul Kiel & Annie Waldman, The Color of Debt: How Collection Suits Squeeze Blacks
Neighborhoods, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/debt-collectionlawsuits-squeeze-black-neighborhoods [ https://perma.cc/N93Z-CUVK ]; see also Breno Braga et al.,
Local Conditions and Debt in Collections (Urban Inst., Working Paper, 2016), https://www.urban.org/
sites/default/files/publication/81886/2000841-Local-Conditions-and-Debt-in-Collections.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/HGB4-8UER ] .
320. Braga et al., supra note 319.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. JAKE HALPERN, BAD PAPER: CHASING DEBT FROM WALL STREET TO THE
UNDERWORLD (2014).
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women or minorities.324 Similarly, the FDIC runs its own minority bank deposit
program entitled the Minority Depository Institution Program (MDIP).325 The
MBDA, the successor to the OMBE, is still active and advertises on its website that
it is “the only federal agency created specifically to foster the establishment and
growth of minority-owned business in America.”326 Its most advertised feature is a
website for minority entrepreneurs called the “Minority Business Internet Portal,”
which is described as “an e-commerce solution designed for the MBE [Minority
Business Enterprise] community.”327
In 2007, the Congressional Committee on Financial Services held a hearing to
assess whether regulatory agencies were meeting the FIRREA mandate of
“preserving and expanding minority banks.”328 Black bank representatives and top
agency officials testified about the state of minority banks with a focus on blackowned banks. An expansive Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
accompanied the hearing.
Each agency offered its own explanation of how it was working towards the
FIRREA mandate. The FDIC testified that it was offering “technical assistance”
and “training and educational programs” to minority banks.329 As for its charge to
preserve and promote minority banks, it explained that no formal process existed.
Instead, it made decisions on a case-by-case basis. The Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) explained that it had held conferences and offered technical
assistance. It further noted that after periodic bank examinations, the examiners
contacted minority institutions to “make sure that the institution understands any
issues or concerns that we have highlighted in the report.”330 Similarly, the OTS
explained that its program involved technical assistance and education.
The hearing revealed that the theme of the support being given to black banks
involved education, guidance, training, and counseling. Apparently, it was not just
minority subprime borrowers that needed education, but also minority banks.
Because of Section 308’s vague requirements and a lack of any clear mandate from
the president or Congress, the regulators have essentially designated themselves as
high school guidance counselors—available for advice or technical assistance with
the occasional workshops for good measure.
Unsurprisingly, the minority banks chose not to rely on their regulators for
help. In fact, the GAO reported that only 30% of minority banks had used the

324.
Chapter III - Financial Requirements and Payments, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. ( Jan. 2008),
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/policydocs/pappguide/nsf08_1/aag_3.jsp [ https://perma.cc/PD24WZAZ ]; Minority Bank Deposit Program (MBDP), U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://
fiscal.treasury.gov/mbdp/ [ https://perma.cc/NK6P-YH9Y ] ( last visited May 15, 2019 ).
325. FDIC, supra note 260.
326. MD. SMALL BUS. DEV. CTR., http://www.mdsbdc.umd.edu/resources/minority-andother-specialized-business-sectors [ https://perma.cc/SS4T-XAKH ].
327. Id.
328.
329. Id.
330. Preserving and Expanding Minority Banks, supra note 302.
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technical assistance offered by regulators.331 Moreover, no agency had ever assessed
whether its “assistance” actually helped these banks. The GAO report revealed that
the agencies had “not undertaken the more difficult and time-consuming, but
ultimately much more important, task of truly understanding the unique challenges
these institutions face” or of trying to tailor their “regulations, supervision and
examinations” to help black banks.332 Notably, less than one-third thought the
regulators were doing a “very good” or “good” job.333 Robert Cooper, representing
the National Bankers Association, the main trade group for black-owned banks, put
it bluntly: “To be honest,” said Cooper, “we have not seen much benefit from
FIRREA Section 308.”334 Regulators had not applied “any different rules or
approaches to minority institutions than majority institutions.”335 Regulators were
just doing the bare minimum required by law, which amounted to “technical
assistance,” and had “steadfastly refused” to use their power to benefit minority
banks.336 Unsurprisingly, the regulatory support was a facade as was the premise
underlying the entire framework.
Even before the financial crisis wiped out the industry, several government
studies showed that black banks were lagging significantly behind their peers in
profitability. According to S&P data, the average median return on equity in 2016
was 8.04% for the banking industry. For black-owned banks, the median was just
1.19%.337 Over the course of a century of operation, the reasons black banks
remained unprofitable had not changed. Cooper told Congress that the biggest
struggles black banks faced were (1) the economically depressed communities they
operate in, (2) their need to keep high reserves for losses, (3) higher general expenses
than other banks, and (4) higher transaction costs because they deal with a higher
proportion of retail customers on a face-to-face basis.338 The CEO of Liberty Bank,
one of the largest and most successful black-owned banks, describes his bank’s
struggle: “[M]y expenses are twice as much because I have to do more counseling
to my borrower. I may have to have guard service because I am in a high crime area.
My deposits are much smaller.”339
It was clear that the black banks knew exactly what their problems were, and
it was not a lack of technical knowledge. However, just as it is unfair to place the
burden of the racial wealth gap on black banks, it is unfair to blame bank regulators
331. Id.
332. Written Testimony of Robert Patrick Cooper Chairman Elect National Bankers Association
Before the Subcomm. Gov’t Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Fin. Services of the U.S. H.R. (2007)
[hereinafter Written Testimony].
333. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MINORITY BANKS: REGULATORS’ ASSESSMENTS
OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR SUPPORT EFFORTS HAVE BEEN LIMITED 4 (2006).
334. Written Testimony, supra note 332.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Preserving and Expanding Minority Banks, supra note 302.
338. Id. at 26.
339. Patricia Gaines, What Happened to the Black Banks?, EBONY ( June 16, 2016), https://
www.ebony.com/career-finance/black-banks-pt-1/ [ https://perma.cc/P4L6-XGF8 ].
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for not helping enough. The regulators’ sole focus is to manage bank risks. They
simply do not have the tools, mandate, or even the education to understand and fix
the unique hardships that black banks face.
Before the legislature could resolve any of the issues presented at the hearing,
the 2008 financial crisis rocked the country, particularly the established banking
regulatory framework. Congress responded with the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. The
Dodd-Frank Act contained a few provisions centered on minority banks, but they
were far from robust. The Act ignored almost all of the recommendations that arose
during the hearings. In fact, Section 367(4)(A) marked the only change to the
regulatory framework. This section amended Section 308 of FIRREA to apply to
all the banking agencies, not just the OTS and the FDIC.340 Additionally, Section
342 of Dodd-Frank required each banking agency to establish an Office of Minority
and Women Inclusion (OMWI), which was designed to increase diversity of agency
staff and to offer assistance to minority and women controlled banks. Because of
Dodd-Frank, every agency now offers technical assistance. However, there are still
no tax breaks, no help with capital, and no structural reforms.
TOWARD FUNDAMENTAL REFORM
Instead of recognizing that white majoritarian institutions have been complicit
in and even benefited from black America’s poverty, the state has repeatedly placed
the burden to close the wealth gap on the black community itself. During pivotal
moments in our nation’s history when the country was in the mood to address racial
injustices, real economic reform aimed at wealth and land redistribution was
thwarted in favor of half measures and pseudo-reforms. During Reconstruction,
instead of the promised forty acres and a mule, the freed slaves got a bank. In order
to pass his monumental and redistributive New Deal agenda, FDR chose to leave
blacks out of the bounty in order to get southern Democrat approval of his
sweeping reforms. Then during the 1960s, when the focus of the black rights
movement shifted from civil to economic equality, a complex and combustible
political environment led Richard Nixon to choose black capitalism over housing
integration. Instead of George Romney’s open communities, Nixon gave black
banks government agency deposits. Successive administrations discontinued the
War on Poverty before it could bear fruit and replaced it with a war on crime, drugs,
and taxes; all of which had devastating effects on the most vulnerable black
communities.
These diversions were not always done out of malice. There have been major
political and social roadblocks to dealing effectively with the wealth gap, and each
of history’s potential reformers have faced them. The biggest roadblock is inherent
in majoritarian democracy itself. Once race was used to divide up the population,
tribalism assured that blacks would always be in the minority. Though America’s
340. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 367(4)(A), 124 Stat. 1556 (2010).
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constitutional democracy has safeguards for the protection of minorities, there are
also heavy majoritarian constraints. For example, for nearly a century, the Senate
was the dam against progress. Even when the dam had been breached, the results
have fallen short of full justice to blacks. Demands for integration or reparations
faced vociferous public and electoral opposition because they came at a price.
Scuttling those claims, legislators pushed forward weak versions of redress like
affirmative action, which had enough consensus to pass, but would not lead to real
economic equality. Even those have become lightning rods of political opposition.
A 2016 study glibly predicted that based on the current racial wealth gap, it
would take 228 years for blacks to have as much wealth as whites today. The
prediction is inaccurate on two dimensions.341 If nothing changes, no amount of
time will close the wealth gap because of the self-perpetuating cycles of poverty and
lack of wealth. However, heretofore untried changes can close the wealth gap very
quickly. In 1894, a London newspaper predicted that “in fifty years, every street in
London will be buried under nine feet of manure.”342 This dire outcome did not
consider that horses would not be the primary mode of transportation in fifty years
and that the automobile, an invention that was right around the corner, would
transform life. Once motivated to deal with the wealth gap, radical solutions may
emerge. There is no reason to believe that the future is just horse manure—even
though that is all we have ever used to tackle the racial wealth gap.
An essential first step in dealing with the wealth gap is to acknowledge that it
was created through racist public policy. Full justice demands recognition of the
historic breach of the social contract between America’s constitutional democracy
and black Americans. And contract breach requires a remedy. Without that
recognition, the Constitution itself stands as a roadblock to redress because it
demands that all individuals be neither harmed nor benefited based on group
characteristics. But it is unfair to be held to a contract that has already been violated.
Blacks have been harmed in direct contradiction to the Constitution’s promise of
equal treatment yet they have still had to contend with its demand of equal treatment
in seeking a remedy.
There has been a powerful political resistance against any form of
compensatory damages for past wrongs such as housing integration or reparations.
But economic equality must proceed down one of those paths.343 It is time to
confront history directly, to recognize a breach, and provide compensation. The
United States has not yet formally apologized for slavery or the years of Jim Crow
laws and segregation. Because it has not done so, that history continues to linger.

341. Ben Johnson, The Great Horse Manure Crisis of 1894, HISTORIC UK; Dedrick AsanteMuhammad et al., The Ever-Growing Gap: Without Change, African-American and Latino Families Won’t
Match White Wealth for Centuries, CFED & INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. 6, 11 (Aug. 2016), https://ipsdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/The-Ever-Growing-Gap-CFED_IPS-Final-2.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/PWY4-GA6F ].
342. Johnson, supra note 341.
343. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC, June 2014.
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Not just through the wealth gap, but through continuing racism. Theories of racial
inferiority were used to justify the injustices of slavery and Jim Crow, and even while
both of those institutions were defeated, the theories lingered on because they were
never confronted directly. White supremacy not only lingered, but increased in the
years after slavery was ended. And a forceful backlash followed the civil rights era
reforms of the 1960s. American institutions failed to acknowledge that a breach had
occurred, a breach justified with claims of racial inferiority. The Nuremburg trials
in Germany and South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Committee allowed these
countries to confront their racial atrocities forthrightly. Americans of all races would
be well served through such a public airing.
There are a few examples of how such a reckoning might take place and what
it could achieve. In 2016, Georgetown University admitted that it had purchased
272 slaves in 1838 and promised to give each descendant of these slaves preferred
treatment in admissions.344 The university is planning a “Mass Reconciliation”
where it will recognize and apologize for its history. Georgetown’s President, John
DeGioia, explained, “We cannot do our best work if we refuse to take ownership
of such a critical part of our history.”345 Another example is tied to private
companies that benefited financially from the convict labor system. The spoils of
the system have enriched some of the largest Southern companies, including the
First Atlanta Bank, which held the fortune of one of the largest convict-slave
holders in the South, James English. After Wachovia acquired First Atlanta, the
bank decided to formally recognize its ill-gotten gains. In 2005, Wachovia issued a
formal apology to “all Americans and especially to African Americans and people
of African descent” and established a scholarship for minorities.346 Ken Thomas,
former CEO and white Southerner explained that he was “overwhelmed by the
emotional impact our apology had for African American employees.”347 After the
apology and internal group discussions with employees, “workers cried, held hands,
embraced one another regardless of company rank, and, in an unprecedented way,
began speaking to one another.”348 A formal apology and a scholarship fund do not
erase the injustice of the past, but at Wachovia, it led to healing and harmony.
Beyond a formal apology, however, designing a compensation program would
present significant practical and legal hurdles. Distinctions based on color or race
were a fiction to begin with such that trying to use strict racial categories to separate
people would lead to absurd results. Some modern descendants of slaves would be
overcompensated, and some would be undercompensated because their racial
344. Rachel L. Swarns, 272 Slaves Were Sold to Save Georgetown: What Does It Owe Their
Descendants?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2016.
345. Kathryn Vasel, Georgetown to Offer Slave Descendants Preferential Admission Status, CNN
(Sept. 1, 2016), https://money.cnn.com/2016/09/01/pf/college/georgetown-university-slavedescendants-admissions/index.html [ https://perma.cc/E2T4-J5NH ].
346. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF
BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 392 (2008).
347. Id.
348. Id.
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identity has shifted over time. Moreover, the recently created myth of
colorblindness is so doggedly defended by the Courts and the American public that
it would prove difficult to dismantle. These practical and philosophical barriers
would certainly diminish public support for an already unpopular idea. A 2016
Marist/PBS poll found that 81% of white Americans opposed reparations for
slavery. Of blacks, 58 % supported it.349 As Al Brophy explains in Reparations: Pro
& Con, “[T]he cost of a meaningful program of reparations—and racial justice—
will be colossal, though so will the benefits.”350
However, it is possible to avoid the tricky racial identity quagmire and to link
redress to more recent injustices instead of a historically remote harm like slavery.
The point of this Article has not been to propose a particular proposal, but rather
to demonstrate that past efforts have fallen short and that any plan to bridge the
wealth gap must include integration or a means to acquire capital. Based on these
findings, there are a few policy designs worth considering. One is to just follow the
red lines and focus on home ownership. Most of the neighborhoods that were
initially redlined in 1934 have been perpetually denied credit and thus remain
pockets of poverty. Racial ghettos, once created, have had remarkable staying
power. Across the country, these black ghettos are still the territories where the
wealth and well-being gap are most drastically highlighted. These are the districts
where poverty is still concentrated, schools are segregated, and properties continue
to be devalued. By focusing a reparations program on geography as opposed to
identity, policymakers can not only avoid the sacred cow of colorblindness, but they
can link reparations with integration.
Moreover, a program focused on home ownership or mortgage credit instead
of a cash payment, which is how reparations have typically been conceived, will
likely yield better outcomes both in garnering public support and in effectively
breaking the intergenerational wealth gap. A cash transfer might lead to a positive
outcome for the generation that receives it, but only if that generation uses it as an
investment yielding future benefits. Home and land ownership, on the other hand,
have the potential to lead to long-term intergenerational benefits as the home and
land get passed down. A home can also be used as collateral for other life-enhancing
loans, like consumer or student loans. There is a historic precedent for such a
program. Because land grants and mortgage subsidies were the process through
which white Americans gained a wealth advantage over black Americans, there is
every reason to use land or mortgages as a program that would level the playing
field.

349.
Renee Stepler, 5 Key Takeaways about Views of Race and Inequality in America, PEW
RES. CTR. ( June 27, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/27/key-takeaways-raceand-inequality/ [ https://perma.cc/3KZU-X984 ]; Jesse J. Holland, Poll: Millennials More Open to
Idea of Slavery Reparations, AP NEWS (May 11, 2016), https://www.apnews.com/
b183a022831d4748963fc8807c204b08 [ https://perma.cc/8JZT-25MG ]; Race Relations, GALLUP
(2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1687/race-relations.aspx [ https://perma.cc/PK3E-VD66 ].
350. ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS: PRO & CON 179 (2008).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3395876

Clean Final Edit_Baradaran.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

5/18/19 8:43 PM

JIM CROW CREDIT

161

Through a process called “greenlining,” public and private funds could be
deployed to spur wealth creation among individuals and communities. In the same
way that FHA loan guarantees spurred a robust mortgage market, greenlining can
lower the cost of mortgage lending. This can be done through a variety of financial
mechanisms. In the most direct analogy to previous FHA programs, HUD, in
conjunction with the GSE’s, would guarantee mortgages through participating
banks. Banks would issue the loan, which would be guaranteed against default by
the federal government. Unlike the subprime mortgage lending preceding the crisis,
these loans would be priced according to their risk, which would be very small due
to the government guarantee. These loans would have to be made available to
current residents of the area so as to not displace residents and induce outsiders to
take advantage of the guarantees. In the event of loan default, the government
would suffer the risk of losses of these mortgages, however.
Another option with even lower costs or risks to the government is to offer
“shared equity mortgages” (SEMs) or “shared appreciation mortgages,” a hybrid
debt/equity mortgage. The essential structure is that an investor together with a
borrower own a property jointly. A borrower who might not be able to come up
with a down payment on her own would enter into a joint mortgage agreement with
either a private investor (a bank or a non-profit) or a public investor (like federal,
state, or local government fund) who would supply the down payment. The
borrower who occupied the property would make mortgage payments instead of
monthly rental payments. At the end of the mortgage cycle or upon sale, the equity
would be split between the investor and the borrower. In case of borrower default,
the investor could take possession of the home and the debt. All equity retrieved
from a home sale or even a foreclosure would be split evenly between the parties.
This arrangement would allow low-income individuals who otherwise could not
own a home to own half of the value of a home and begin to accrue wealth.
Investors would be protected from the downside because they own the property as
a joint tenant, which means that they own it in full if the borrower stops paying the
mortgage payments.
One important benefit of an SEM in green-lined areas would be that it would
provide an incentive for the investing partner, either a non-profit, bank, or
government agency, to make sure that the property appreciated in value. Property
values rise when schools, parks, public facilities, and other indicators of community
health improve. Research and history show that when individuals own their homes,
they are more invested in their community. This double investment would link
individuals, private corporations, non-profits, and government entities in improving
neighborhoods unlike the subprime lenders or contract sellers whose main
motivation was one-time profits.
One problem in the above programs is that neighborhoods remain racially
segregated at least until the wealth gap begins to disappear. One option to disrupt
segregation is a housing voucher program, which has been tested by some
municipalities. In its current form, these vouchers have only applied to rental
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properties or Section 8 housing. However, in order to build wealth, these vouchers
would need to be tied to a wealth-creating property. Vouchers could take the form
of an SEM arrangement and the borrower could choose a home in any
neighborhood. The focus is to reverse blighted communities stuck in cycles of
poverty due to segregation. These trends can change by upsetting racial segregation
patterns or by enriching the residents of the urban ghetto so they themselves can
choose to move out while others move in. To maintain racial neutrality in vouchers,
the program would focus on residents of formerly redlined areas. Another selection
possibility is to create criteria based on a mix of factors aimed at selecting individuals
of any race, but who meet an income threshold and are below an asset and income
maximum. In other words, any individual would qualify for a voucher so long as
they had sufficient income to make a modest mortgage payment but had income
below the national average. This casts the net much wider and would therefore be
more expensive, but such is the cost of demanding colorblindness.
Public institutions could also deliver these loans directly. For example, instead
of using banks or investors as middlemen, federal, state, or local funds could be
used to lend into these areas with the profits returning to the public treasury instead
of being shared by the bank. A state or municipality can even establish a public bank
for this purpose. North Dakota has a public state bank, and one of its most
successful functions has been to offer credit to regions of the state that private
banks have neglected, such as with rural mortgages.351 Public banking actually works
best when there is a well-defined mission that the market is not meeting. This has
been the model for development banks abroad as well as our own historic GSE’s,
FHA lending programs, postal banking operations, and even federally backed funds
like the FDIC and the Federal Reserve that have stepped in to fill a void created by
the private market. Indeed, it would be fitting for a quasi-public entity like the FHA
to be created to fix the problem the FHA itself created.
The drawback of all of these plans is that they attempt to break the cycle of
poverty, unemployment, and community decline through mortgage debt. This is
what the FHA did after the Great Depression and it yielded the desired results, but
can mortgages lead to prosperity today? Credit today is not what credit was in postwar America. In a growing and dynamic economy, credit meant wealth creation.
Prominent economist Robert Gordon has made the case that America is headed
toward an era of stagnant growth, which could mean that it would be unwise to
attempt to create wealth through mortgage debt without changing the fundamental
structure of the economy. If a program only increases debt without adding
opportunities, such as increased incomes and wealth generation through property
appreciation, the expected gains will not be realized. However, there is reason to
believe that some of this stagnant growth can be remedied by focusing on inequality.

351. Eric Hardmeyer, Why Public Banking Works in North Dakota, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/10/01/should-states-operate-public-banks/whypublic-banking-works-in-north-dakota [ https://perma.cc/RBE5-APLS ].
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In other words, by bringing back the New Deal era ethos of a mixed economy, or
a government-private partnership, the economy can be spurred toward creation.
Dealing with inequality can have trickle-up effects and raise all boats. 352
The assumption on which all of these schemes are based is that the home
would increase in value. This has not been the case with black homes. This is what
led Emory professor Dorothy Brown to suggest that blacks avoid purchasing homes
and instead focus on building wealth through stock ownership. She argued that
black homes have not increased in value and so homeownership has been a drain
on black wealth. She suggested that even though stocks may be riskier than
property, for blacks, they were a safer long-term investment.353 This sound advice
was the best indictment of the home value gap in America today.
However, there is reason to believe that homeownership can still create wealth.
Despite occasional asset bubbles, home values have continued their steady rise in
America.354 Further, home prices follow a positive feedback loop such that the more
people own homes in a community, the more home values rise across the board,
creating more wealth. Higher wealth then leads to a bigger tax base, which leads to
better schools, which in turn lead to higher incomes down the road. Children who
grow up in communities of homeowners have better outcomes across the board.
Thus, the cycle is reversed. In addition, there is reason to believe that racism has
diminished enough such that black properties would not force a decline on
neighborhood values.
We decidedly do not live in a post-racial society, but it is important to step
back and note the undeniable progress in social, scientific, and political thought.
Take the case of interracial marriage. Fears of miscegenation were the backdrop to
the Jim Crow framework and the fuel that fed much of the violence toward black
men. In 1958, only 4% of Americans approved of interracial marriage. By 2013, a
Gallup poll found that 87% of Americans approve.355 Having mapped the human
genome, modern science has now fully dispelled the myth that race is a meaningful

352. GORDON, supra note 85 (explaining that global inequality will continue to push against
growth); Paul Krugman, Why We’re in a New Gilded Age, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 8, 2014; see also JACOB
S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, AMERICAN AMNESIA: HOW THE WAR ON GOVERNMENT LED US TO
FORGET WHAT MADE AMERICA PROSPER (2016); PIKETTY, supra note 85; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Inequality
and Economic Growth, 86 POL. Q. 134 (2015); Paul Krugman, Is Vast Inequality Necessary?, N.Y. TIMES
( Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/15/opinion/is-vast-inequality-necessary.html
[ https://perma.cc/PZY8-P7JQ ].
353. Dorothy Brown, How Home Ownership Keeps Blacks Poorer than Whites, FORBES
(Dec. 10, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/12/10/how-homeownership-keeps-blacks-poorer-than-whites/#79868cca4cce [ https://perma.cc/ZVN8-EAZ3 ].
354. Ilyce Glink, 9 Real Estate Trends to Expect in 2017, CBS NEWS (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.cbsnews.com/media/9-real-estate-trends-to-expect-in-2017/ [ https://perma.cc/
4KZU-SX79 ].
355. Frank Newport, In U.S., 87% Approve of Black-White Marriage vs. 4% in 1958, GALLUP,
July 25, 2013.
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genetic trait.356 Race has never been a biological fact, but only a political weapon,
and that knowledge will soon change public hearts and minds. Politically, Americans
are much more tolerant and pluralistic. The majority of the American public also
elected Barack Obama to office twice. Putting aside the ugly racist backlash
engendered by his presidency, a black president would not have been possible in
any previous era.
We have made strides in recognizing the humanity of others, which only
improves our own humanity. Slavery was possible for so long because whites
refused to acknowledge the humanity of their black slaves. In earlier eras, whites
could push blacks and other immigrants into ghettos and ignore the disease, squalor,
and poverty that resulted—sometimes even using the inevitable decrepitude of the
ghetto to justify further dehumanization of minorities.357 As a society, we can no
longer tolerate this—if only because our digital interconnectedness means we can
no longer ignore the suffering of others. When images surface of white officers
killing unarmed black men, the world sees it immediately and the injustice is difficult
to ignore.
It is easy, however, to ignore signs of racial progress. Behavioral economists
speak of an availability heuristic, which means that when people are asked their
views on a particular issue, they usually use a mental shortcut that over-relies on
immediate and available examples instead of a full range of available information.
This cognitive gap, along with the human mind’s well-documented tendency to
focus on the negative and threatening instead of the positive and mundane, can lead
many people to believe that racism is as bad today as it has ever been. Indeed, the
majority of the population believes that racism is as bad or worse today than it was
twenty years ago.358 Perhaps this is because the first available images that come to
mind when we consider race relations are the most salient: police brutality, racist
internet memes or tweets, race riots, hate crimes, or pictures of police marching into
American cities with military grade weapons. But taking a long historical view,
research shows that human history has thus far been a steady march toward more
justice and more peace with some marked outliers that catch more light than they
should. Indeed, the moral arch of the universe does seem to bend toward justice,
often in a way that is hard to detect and sometimes taking some very tortuous
detours. However, we are less violent, more compassionate, and more tolerant on
the whole than we have been at any point in history.

356. KAREN E. FIELDS & BARBARA J. FIELDS, RACECRAFT: THE SOUL OF INEQUALITY IN
AMERICAN LIFE 9 (2014); IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE
HISTORY OF RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA 476 (2016); SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE GENE: AN
INTIMATE HISTORY 341–50 (2016).
357. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS
DECLINED 170 (2012).
358. Jennifer Agiesta, Race and Reality in America: Five Key Findings, CNN (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/11/24/us/race-reality-key-findings/index.html [ https://perma.cc/
LQ58-JH7R ].
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Racism is not only harmful to blacks, but it is a corrosive influence on white
culture. Frederick Douglass explained that he watched as his white mistress change
as she became a slave master. Her ownership of a human being warped and
corrupted her previously decent character and turned her into hateful
person.359 C. Vann Woodward described how the South lost its soul in its obsessive
and pervasive enforcement of Jim Crow.360 James Baldwin worried about “the death
of the heart” that racism had wrought on American culture for “whoever debases
others is debasing himself.”361 Baldwin also understood that the “future of the negro
in this country is precisely as bright or as dark as the future of the country.”362 The
sooner Americans recognize that the fate of black America is tied to the fate of
white America, the faster it can achieve true democracy and shed the weight of
historic injustices.
Americans must decide whether to keep embracing our history of racial
tribalism or to shed these divisions and go forward as one people, indivisible. Can
America’s majoritarian democracy support a program intended solely to benefit the
black minority? It certainly did not in 1870, 1930, or 1960. However, there is reason
to hope that this is more likely now than ever. We are facing another pivot point.
The racial détente of the 1960s has fallen apart. The myth of post-racial America
has been dispelled and renewed tensions have erupted on the national stage as well
as in segregated pockets of poverty in America.
Modernity will inevitably bring us closer together, which can either lead to
greater resentment or greater cooperation. Perhaps more people will realize that
what benefits a minority will also benefit the majority. Full racial integration will
eventually remove pockets of blight, crime, and deprivation across the country. This
will benefit the entire American population. Integrated schools benefit all students
and increased equality will spur economic growth.363 We must shed these
destructive myths that separate can be equal, that a segregated economy will reach
prosperity on its own, or that black banks can lead to black prosperity without
fundamental economic changes. We cannot deflect the responsibility of economic
equality onto these communities alone. W.E.B Dubois declared in 1948 that the
great problem of American democracy was that “it had not yet been tried.”364
Perhaps it is time to try.
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